



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

March 1, 1983

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is the final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem regarding ITT Grinnell Category II planner for Category I work. This condition was reported via telephone to H. Kister of your staff on October 26, 1982, as a potentially reportable deficiency. An interim 30-day report was submitted to you on November 24, 1982.

Very truly yours,

S. F. Manno
Vice President
Nuclear Construction

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. R. D. Schulz, Resident Inspector

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for the Problem
Concerning ITT Grinnell Category II Planners
for Category I Work

Description of the Problem

Two 2-in. QA Category I, ASME III Safety Class 3 lines (2SWP-002-803-3[B] and 2SWP-002-802-3[A]) in the service water system were identified on ITT Grinnell Field Planner SB-400 that was incorrectly designated QA Category II by ITT Grinnell engineers. The planner had been issued to the field but work had not been started.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Our evaluation indicates that even if the two 2-in. lines in question were assumed to have failed, the reduction in flow would not have jeopardized the safety function of the service water system.

An evaluation for the effects of flooding, due to the failure of these lines, on other safety-related components has also been performed. Since both lines are moderate energy lines and are seismically supported inside the QA Category I tunnel, a through-wall-leakage crack in one line is postulated for this evaluation. The leak would be detected within a 24-hour period by automatic actuation of nonsafety-related sumps or during damage surveillance after an accident or a seismic event. Our evaluation indicates that the accumulation of water during the detection, location, and repair period poses no hazard to other safety-related components. Therefore, if this problem were to have remained uncorrected, it would not have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

Field Planner SB-400 has since been cancelled. As stated in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, Inspection Report No. 50-410/82-12, ITT Grinnell issued a stop work order on all small bore piping in order to determine if any other small bore planner packages were issued with the incorrect category designation. In addition, ITT Grinnell reviewed 679 Category II large bore piping planner packages to ensure the correct category designation. ITT Grinnell's review of all other small bore planner packages and the 679 Category II large bore piping planner packages indicated that all had the correct QA category designations.

In order to prevent reoccurrence, ITT Grinnell has modified its General Engineering Procedures (GEP) 40 to incorporate a checklist to ensure that the correct QA category designation is specified.