

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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February 28, 1983

Re: Docket No. 50-278

Mr. R. C. Haynes, Administrator  
Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19046

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. A. R. Blough of Region I, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on February 15, 1983.

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|----------------|--|
| Reference:     | Docket No. 50-278  |
| Report Number: | 3-83-08/IT   |
| Event Date:    | February 14, 1983  |
| Report Date:   | February 28, 1983  |
| Facility:      | Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station<br>RD 1, Delta, PA 17314 |

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(3) requires prompt notification within 24 hours with written follow-up within 10 working days for any abnormal degradation discovered in primary containment.

Technical Specification 4.7.A.2.f sets a maximum leakage rate limit of 11.5 scf/hr for any one main steamline isolation valve.

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10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Section III.C.3 requires that "the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests shall be less than 0.6La."

Description of the Event:

With Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, Surveillance Testing indicated that the combined leakage for Type B and C tests exceeded the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Section III.C.3 limit of 0.6La. Three of eight Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) failed to pass the Technical Specification limit of 11.5 SCFH. In addition, containment isolation valve MO 2-74 failed a local leak rate test. Previous Occurrences: 2/82-21/3L, 3-81-11/3L, 2-80-13/3L, 3-79-36/3L.

Probable Consequences of the Event:

Redundant MSIV's were operable and had acceptable leak rates. Redundant valve MO 2-77, in line with MO 2-74, is in an operable condition.

Cause of the Event:

Apparent cause of the event is abnormal wear of valve internals. Actual cause has not been determined.


Immediate Corrective Action:

Because Unit 3 is cold shutdown, no immediate corrective action is required per Technical Specifications.

Future Corrective Action:

All failed valves will be disassembled for inspection, repaired as appropriate, and retested prior to Unit 3 startup. A 30-day follow-up report will be submitted following completion of all Type B and C tests and will include other failures found during the current refueling outage.

Sincerely,



M. J. Cooney  
Superintendent  
Nuclear Generation Division

cc: Document Control Desk  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

A. R. Blough  
Site Inspector  
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