



Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20545

Docket No. 50-537
HQ:S:83:233

MAR 07 1983

Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Director
CRBR Program Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Dr. Grace:

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE OPERATING CASES AND SENSITIVITY EVALUATIONS,
PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (PSAR) TABLE 5.6-12

Reference: Letter HQ:S:82:149, J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check, "Meeting
Summary for the Shutdown Heat Removal Meeting, December 10,
1982," dated December 20, 1982

It has been noted that an error has been made in updating the PSAR
(Amendment 76) to incorporate Action No. 1 from the referenced letter.

Enclosed is the corrected PSAR Table 5.6-12. This corrected table will be
included in a future PSAR amendment.

Any questions regarding the subject item can be addressed to Mr. D. Florek
(FTS 626-6188) or Mr. A. Meller (FTS 626-6355) of the Project Office Oak
Ridge staff.

Sincerely,

John R. Longenecker
Acting Director, Office of
Breeder Demonstration Projects
Office of Nuclear Energy

Enclosure

cc: Service List
Standard Distribution
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TABLE 5.6-12

DHRs OPERATING CASES AND SENSITIVITY EVALUATIONS

DHRs OPERATING CASE (1)	PEAK TEMPERATURE	NUMBER OF PHTS LOOPS	NUMBER OF IHTS LOOPS	NUMBER OF DHRs TRAINS	CONSERVATIVE DECAY HEAT	EVST HEAT LOAD	NA FLOW GPM	NAK FLOW GPM
Design Case	~ 1120°F	3	0	2	Yes	Yes	560	800
Updated Design Case	~ 1052°F	3	0	2	Yes ⁽²⁾ (3)	Yes	560	800
Single Failure Evaluation #1	~ 1055°F	⁽³⁾ 2(4)	2	1	Nominal Values Used	No	600	600
Single Failure Evaluation #2	¹¹³⁷ ~ 1160 ⁽²⁾ (3)	2	0	1	Yes ⁽²⁾ (3)	No	600	600
Delayed Start Design Case (~ 45 minutes to DHRs operation)	~ 1078	3	0	2	Yes ⁽²⁾ (3)	Yes	560	800

(1) Conservatism included in all cases: Shutdown at end of cycle at full power; no consideration of insulation, no consideration of SGS heat capacity.

~~(2)~~ Exceeds present DHRs hot leg temperature limit of 1140°F.---

(2) ~~(3)~~ Decay heat values have been revised to reflect current conservative design values

(3) ~~(4)~~ The two PHTS loops assumption conservatively envelopes the assumption that a PHTS pump or pony motor fails to operate.

5.6-35g

Amend. 76
March 1983

ATTACHMENT TO:
LEM-83-029