



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

February 24, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-008/99X0

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2f, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-008/99X0. This report is required within forty-four (44) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *JH*

CC: Distribution

8303090215 830224
PDR ADOCK 05000311
S PDR

The Energy People

TE22
95-2189 (20M) 11-81

Report Number: 83-008/99X0
Report Date: 02-23-83
Occurrence Date: 01-31-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Plant Systems - Diesel Generator Area Low Pressure CO₂ System - Inoperable.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 55 % - Unit Load 550 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0802 hours, January 18, 1983, during routine operation, the Diesel Generator Area Low Pressure CO₂ System automatic initiation feature was disabled and tagged out for planned maintenance. A continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment was immediately established in the area. The tagout was necessary to insure personnel safety during work in the diesel generator spaces. With the feature inoperable, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3a applied. The CO₂ system manual actuation capability remained operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

As noted, entry into the action statement was for the purpose of insuring personnel safety during planned maintenance.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the fire suppression systems ensure that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Action Statement 3.7.10.3a Requires:

With one or more of the above required low pressure CO2 systems inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for unprotected area(s) within 1 hour; restore the inoperable system to operable status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a special report to the commission pursuant to specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

As noted, a continuous fire watch with backup fire equipment was established, in compliance with the action statement. Since protection was maintained, the event involved no risk to the health and safety of the public. Due to additional administrative and procedural controls imposed during planned maintenance, the occurrence did not constitute operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

On January 31, 1983, the 14 day time period specified in Action Statement 3.7.10.3a elapsed, and the event became reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2f, Special Reports for Fire Suppression Systems.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Due to continuing work in the diesel generator area, the automatic CO₂ actuation feature will be kept disabled until completion of the present Unit 2 refueling outage, projected for May 1983. The manual actuation capability will be maintained operable, and the fire watch and backup suppression equipment will be available until that time.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm


General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-022