

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	J	S	G	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
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LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

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0	1		6	0	5	0	0	0	2	7	2	7	0	1	2	6	8	3	8	0	2	2	3	8	3	9
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REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On January 26, 1983, during a routine refueling it was discovered that non-seismically qualified components had been installed in the DC control power feeds to the emergency diesel generators. Design Change Request LEC-1355 was completed during refueling, DC power boxes were installed to provide an alternate control power source in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R. On January 28th, it was discovered the supports of the power selector boxes was also non-seismically qualified. In both cases, the diesel generators were declared inoperable, and the appropriate action statements were entered. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.9b.

0	9	E	E	11	B	12	A	13	C	K	T	B	R	K	14	X	15	Z	16
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SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CRUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

17	8	3		0	0	6		0	3	L		0
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LER NO. REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.

F	18	H	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	L	25	F	0	5	5	26
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ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The problem resulted from oversight of the effect of the non-seismic design change on the seismically qualified normal feeds. In the first instance seismically qualified components were immediately installed. In the second instance, seismically qualified supports were designed and installed. In both cases, the emergency generators were restored to an operable status, and the action statements were terminated.

1	5	C	28	0	0	0	29	N/A	30	C	31	Design Change Follow-up	32
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FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A	35	N/A	36
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ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A	39
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PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

1	8	0	0	0	40	S	41	8303090185 830225 PDR ADDCK 05000272 PDR	42
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PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

1	9	Z	42	N/A	43
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LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

2	0	N	44	N/A	45
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PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION

NAME OF PREPARER R. Frahm

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