



**LOUISIANA**  
POWER & LIGHT

142 DELARONDE STREET

P. O. BOX 8008 • NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174 • (504) 366-2345

March 1, 1983

L. V. MAURIN

Vice President Nuclear Operations

W3P83-0654

3-A1.01.04

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76012


SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3  
Docket No. 50-382  
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 69  
"Crosby Valve & Gage Co. Stellite Alloy  
#6B Discs"  
First Interim Report

Reference: Telecon between M. A. Livesay (LP&L) and W. A. Crossman (NRC)  
on January 28, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), attached are two copies of the interim response to Significant Construction Deficiency No. 69. This item was previously identified as PRD # 100.

Very truly yours,

  
L. V. Maurin

LVM/MAL/ssd

- cc: 1) Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555
- 2) Director  
Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555
- 3) E. Blake
- 4) W. Stevenson

IE 27

INTERIM REPORT OF  
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 69  
CROSBY VALVE & GAGE CO. STELLITE ALLOY #6B DISCS

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency in the valve discs used in the Safety Injection and Chemical and Volume Control Systems relief valves. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

Two replacement discs were procured from the Crosby Valve & Gage Co. for the valves 2CH-R1526A and 2CH-R1527 A/B. The manufacturer used solid Haynes Stellite Alloy #6B from wrought bar stock to manufacture these discs. An examination of the reports submitted indicated that the material in question failed to meet the ASME requirements. The vendor's drawings were reviewed and it was discovered that the discs for an additional 8 valves (total no. 10) were also made from Solid Stellite 6B.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The above mentioned relief valves are installed in safety related systems such as the Safety Injection and the Chemical and Volume Control Systems. Failure of the discs would allow uncontrolled discharge of the fluid at pressures lower than the design set point. This condition is considered significant and could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Nonconformance Report W3-5572 was initiated to track and document corrective action. The Solid Stellite 6B valve discs will be replaced with certified material which meets ASME code requirements. All removed Solid Stellite 6B valve discs will be tagged and returned to Ebasco's Site Warehouse for further disposition.

Further information concerning the progress of the corrective action will be submitted by May 10, 1981.

INTERIM REPORT OF  
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 69  
CROSBY VALVE & GAGE CO. STELLITE ALLOY #6B DISCS

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency in the valve discs used in the Safety Injection and Chemical and Volume Control Systems relief valves. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

Two replacement discs were procured from the Crosby Valve & Gage Co. for the valves 2CH-R1526A and 2CH-R1527 A/B. The manufacturer used solid Haynes Stellite Alloy #6B from wrought bar stock to manufacture these discs. An examination of the reports submitted indicated that the material in question failed to meet the ASME requirements. The vendor's drawings were reviewed and it was discovered that the discs for an additional 8 valves (total no. 10) were also made from Solid Stellite 6B.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The above mentioned relief valves are installed in safety related systems such as the Safety Injection and the Chemical and Volume Control Systems. Failure of the discs would allow uncontrolled discharge of the fluid at pressures lower than the design set point. This condition is considered significant and could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Nonconformance Report W3-5572 was initiated to track and document corrective action. The Solid Stellite 6B valve discs will be replaced with certified material which meets ASME code requirements. All removed Solid Stellite 6B valve discs will be tagged and returned to Ebasco's Site Warehouse for further disposition.

Further information concerning the progress of the corrective action will be submitted by May 10, 1983.

DURE PAGE