

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

W. L. STEWART
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

03 FEB 10 4 8: 54

February 2, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Serial No. 041
NO/RMT:acm
Docket Nos. 50-280
50-281
License Nos. DPR-32
DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We have reviewed your letter of January 12, 1983 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station between November 1 and November 30, 1982 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/82-34 and 50-281/82-34. Our response to the specific infraction is attached.

We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure. The information contained in the attached pages is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Very truly yours,


W. L. Stewart

Attachment

cc: Mr. Steven Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/82-34 AND 50-281/82-34

NRC COMMENT:

10 CFR 50.59 requires that the licensee shall maintain records of changes to the facility as described in the final safety analysis report (FSAR). These records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Contrary to the above, records, including a written safety evaluation, were neither generated nor maintained when a change to the facility, as described in the FSAR, was made. Two inch diameter clear tygon tubing was installed on the component cooling water (CCW) system surge tank in parallel with the level indicators. On November 9, 1982, the tygon tubing blew off the surge tank and released radioactive gases into the auxiliary building. The gas flowed to the ventilation vent effluent stack, where the activity was measured as being some 30% of the Technical Specification 3.11.B.1 limit.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.)

RESPONSE:

(1) ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION:

The violation is correct as stated.

(2) REASONS FOR VIOLATION:

This event was discovered and notification made to the NRC by the Licensee. The release did not violate Technical Specification. The temporary level column was installed by Operations Department at an unknown time. The time was most probably many years ago in order to provide an independent indication of level for a specific evolution. At that time no Jumper Log entry was made. As the improved procedural controls were developed and because of the physical location of the temporary tubing we failed to register the jumper.

(3) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED:

The hose blew off as the tank was being refilled with its vent closed. This was necessary due to the higher than normal activity in the component cooling water system. The potential overpressure stress on the tank has been evaluated and shows its design pressure was not exceeded. The hose was permanently removed. The Operations Department was instructed on the potential of tank filling overpressurization and filling methods to protect against overpressurization. The proper use of the Jumper Log was reemphasized. Subsequent tank filling evolutions have been successful.

(4) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS:

No additional steps are necessary.

(5) THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

Compliance has been achieved.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

FEB 18 1983

Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. W. L. Stewart, Vice President
Nuclear Operations
P.O. Box 26666
Richmond, VA 23262

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/82-34 AND 50-281/82-34

Thank you for your letter of February 2, 1983, informing us of steps you have taken to correct the violation concerning activities under NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 brought to your attention in our letter of January 12, 1982. We will examine your corrective actions and plans during subsequent inspections.

We appreciate your cooperation with us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. C. Lewis", is written over the typed name.

R. C. Lewis, Director
Division of Project and
Resident Programs

cc: J. H. Ferguson, Executive
Vice President-Power
J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
P. G. Godwin, Director

A handwritten word, possibly "DUP" or "DUP", is written in dark ink at the bottom right of the page.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

W. L. STEWART
VICE PRESIDENT
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(4) CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS:

No additional steps are necessary.

(5) THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

Full compliance has been achieved.