

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|
| 0 | 1 | M | D | C | C | N | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPECON'T

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

7 8 60 61 68 69 75 80
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 0 | 2 | At 1803 in Mode 3 while testing 21 inverter, deenergization of two RPS channels caused the PORV's to open (T.S. 3.4.3) and the Pressurizer (PZR) Quench Tank rupture disk to open. An operator overrode the PORV's shut 30 seconds later. PZR pressure decreased to 1520 psia initiating SIAS. No water was injected into the RCS. The PORV block valves were shut to repair the PZR Quench Tank rupture disk. The block valves were opened at 0550 on 2/4/83. Similar events: none. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 80

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|---|---|---|---|----|---|----|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|----|---|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 9 | Z | Z | 11 | A | 12 | A | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16 | 17 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | T | 0 | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|----|---|----|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|----|---|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (21)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | 0 | The fuse for RPS Channel A blew due to crossed power leads in 21 inverter. The leads were crossed the previous day during load testing of 21 inverter. A procedure change will be made to perform a functional test or to record the initial and final position of leads on all equipment which had leads lifted during maintenance. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 80

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|---|---|---|----|-----|----|---|----|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | 5 | G | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | N/A | 30 | C | 31 | Investigational Testing | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|---|---|---|----|-----|----|---|----|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | | | | | | | | | | N/A | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|----|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 11 12 13 80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 11 12 80
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | 9 | Z | 42 | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 10 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | 0 | N | 44 | N/A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

7 8 9 10 80
PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION8303010542 830218
PDR AD0CK 05000318
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF P

RER

M. A. Junge

PHONE

301-269-4969

LER NO. 83-07/1T
DOCKET NO. 50-318
LICENSE NO. DPR 69
EVENT DATE 02-03-83
REPORT DATE 02-18-83
ATTACHMENT

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (CONT'D)

At 1803 while in Mode 3, during testing on 21 inverter, a voltage spike in the 120V vital AC system resulted in a fuse blowing which in turn caused the Reactor Protective System (RPS) channel A to be deenergized. In anticipation of the fuse blowing, a Licensed Operator had previously been instructed to deenergize RPS channel A. He mistakenly deenergized RPS channel D. The 2 of 4 coincidence of the deenergized pressurizer pressure high modules caused the PORV's to open (T.S. 3.4.3). An operator overrode the PORV's shut 30 seconds later. Pressurizer pressure decreased to 1520 psia, initiating SIAS. No water was injected into the Reactor Coolant System. Pressurizer pressure was returned to normal at approximately 1900. The pressure increase in the Pressurizer Quench Tank caused the rupture disk to open. At 2120 the PORV block valves were shut for personnel safety while replacing the Quench Tank rupture disk. The PORV block valves were reopened at 0550. Similar events: none.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D)

RPS channel A deenergized due to a DC input fuse to the inverter blowing during a test transfer of 21 inverter. The fuse blew due to crossed power leads in 21 inverter. The leads were crossed the previous day during maintenance on 21 inverter which required the leads to be lifted and replaced with a resistor bank for load testing the inverter. The leads were returned to their correct location. A procedure change will be made to insure either a functional test is performed on equipment in which leads were lifted during maintenance or to record the initial and final position of all leads lifted during maintenance. All Licensed Operators and maintenance personnel will be made aware of this event.