

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6
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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1
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0	H	D	B	S	1
---	---	---	---	---	---

2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0
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3	4	1	1	1	1
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4	5
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7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPECON'T

0	1
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 REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	4	6	7	0	1	1	9	8	3	8	0	1	1	7	8	3	9
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7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(NP-33-83-05) On 1/19/83, it was discovered during a normal cooldown that a jumper on pressure switch PSH-RC2B4 had been left in place since 8/23/82. This pressure switch must close its contacts at 266 psig decreasing to allow DH12 to be opened. DH12 is one of two suction isolation valves in series to the decay heat pumps. Due to an excessive deadband in PSH-RC2B4, each time DH12 must be opened, a jumper is installed to defeat the switch. This event is being reported per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.c.

0	9
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 SYSTEM CODE

C	F
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 (11) CAUSE CODE

A

 (12) CAUSE SUBCODE

A

 (13) COMPONENT CODE

Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
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 (14) COMP. SUBCODE

Z

 (15) VALVE SUBCODE

Z

 (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17) EVENT YEAR

8	3
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 (21) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.

0	0	4
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 (24) OCCURRENCE CODE

0	3
---	---

 (28) REPORT TYPE

L

 (30) REVISION NO.

0

 (32)
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

H

 (18)

F

 (19)

Z

 (20)

Z

 (21)

0	0	0	0
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 (22)

Y

 (23)

N

 (24)

Z

 (25)

Z	9	9	9
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 (26)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause is twofold. The Shift Supervisor did not verify that the jumper was removed which is a lack of proper administrative control in following procedures. He has been reminded of his responsibilities for the administration of procedures. The second cause was design error. FCR 82-168 has been written to provide an adequate pressure switch for this interlock function.

1	5
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 FACILITY STATUS

D

 (28) % POWER

0	0	0
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 (29) OTHER STATUS

NA

 (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY

B

 (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

Plant Shutdown & Cooldown Procedure

 (32)
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

NA

 (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE

NA

 (36)
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER

0	0	0
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 (37) TYPE

Z

 (38) DESCRIPTION

NA

 (39)
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER

0	0	0
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 (40) DESCRIPTION

NA

 (41)
7 8 9 11 12 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE

Z

 (42) DESCRIPTION

NA

 (43)
7 8 9 10 80
PUBLICITY ISSUED

N

 (44) DESCRIPTION

NA

 (45)
7 8 9 10 80
8302280437 830217
PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

U.S. NRC 7-926

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-05

DATE OF EVENT: January 19, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: While performing a normal plant cooldown, a jumper was found in the control circuitry for DH12, suction isolation valve for the decay heat pumps

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0

Description of Occurrence: The plant was in the process of a normal cooldown in accordance with PP 1102.10, Plant Shutdown and Cooldown. As a part of this procedure, the decay heat suction isolation valves, DH11 and DH12, are required to be opened just prior to entering Mode 4. Pressure switch PSH-RC2B4 must close its contacts at 266 psig decreasing to allow DH12 to be opened. The switch functions properly to open at 266 psig increasing to prevent opening DH12, however, the deadband in the switch prevents the switch from resetting within the pressure band required for simultaneous decay heat pump and reactor coolant pump operation. Facility Change Request (FCR) 77-391 was implemented to correct problems with this pressure switch and its deadband. The FCR changes did not correct the problems with PSH-RC2B4, therefore, each time DH12 must be opened, a jumper is installed per PP 1102.10 to defeat PSH-RC2B4 thereby allowing the valve to be opened.

On August 23, 1982, during a plant cooldown, the Shift Supervisor had the jumper installed to open DH12. The cooldown procedure requires that the jumper be removed after DH12 is opened. The Shift Supervisor stated that he called the Electrical Shop to remove the jumper, however, the jumper was never removed. The unit was returned to service and in operation until a plant shutdown on January 18, 1983. During the subsequent cooldown on January 19, 1983, it was discovered that the jumper for PSH-RC2B4, installed on August 23, 1982, was still in place. DH12 was opened, the jumper removed as required by PP 1102.10, and the cooldown continued. This event is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.c.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence is two-fold. At the time of this event, the procedural step was included as a modification to PP 1102.10. This has subsequently been incorporated into the procedure. The Shift Supervisor did not verify that the jumper was in fact removed. This is a lack of proper administrative control in following written procedures. However, if PSH-RC2B4 had properly reset there would have been no need for the jumper to be installed. Therefore, this event must also be classified as a design error as well.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The purpose of the high pressure interlock is to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of the decay heat suction piping. With PSH-RC2B4 defeated, DH12 could have been opened. However, a redundant valve, DH11, downstream of DH12, was closed. DH11 is provided with an independent high pressure closure interlock at 301 psig as a backup to DH12 closure at 266 psig. Both DH11 and DH12 were closed when required.

Corrective Action: A Facility Change Request (82-168) has been submitted to provide an adequate pressure switch for this interlock function. The Shift Supervisor has been reminded of his overall responsibilities for plant control and administration of procedures.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences.

LER #83-004