

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

7 8 9 80

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

| FACILITY | NUMBER | OTHER STATUS | (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | (32) |
|----------|--------|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|------|
| | | | | | |

| ACTIVITY | CONTENT | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | LOCATION OF RELEASE |
|----------|---------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | | (35) | (36) |

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 29

PERSONNEL INJURIES (41)

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (12)

7 8 9 10 PUBLICITY 5 FBI NBC USE ONLY 80

7 8 9 10 68 69 80
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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-06

DATE OF EVENT: January 19, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) MS100 to shut completely

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0

Description of Occurrence: Following a unit trip on January 18, 1983, MSIV MS100 was shut by a Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) signal. With the valve indicating shut, enough steam was present to run a main feed pump at 2000 rpm, operate the Gland Seal System, and bypass several steam traps. The valve was cycled several times, but still continued to pass the same amount of steam.

This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 which requires MS100 to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, and also the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 which requires MS100 to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Pursuant to these action statements, a cooldown was commenced.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Under Maintenance Work Order 83-1486, MS100 was disassembled and inspected. No obvious damage or wear could be found. Valve lineups had been checked for possible paths that could pressurize the header downstream of MS100 at the time the problem was discovered; none could be found. Based on the inspection of the valve and the check of possible steam flowpaths, no reason for this apparent leakage is available. The cause remains unknown.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Under Technical Specification 3.6.3.1, MS100 is needed to isolate Containment. Leakage through the valve is a problem only if a steam generator tube leak is present. Since there was no tube leak, the leakage through MS100 presented no danger. Under Technical Specification 3.7.1.5, MS100 is needed to isolate Steam Generator 1-2 in the event of a steam line break. Since there was no line break, there was no danger as a result of the leakage through MS100.

Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work Order 83-1436, MS100 was reassembled. On January 23, 1983, a post maintenance test of MS100 was conducted. With MS100 shut, the upstream side of the valve was pressurized with nitrogen. The valve held pressure, thereby verifying its integrity. On January 29, 1983 at 1941 hours, Main Steam Isolation Valve Surveillance Test ST 5073.01 was conducted on MS100, and at 2100 hours the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Integrated Test ST 5031.18 was

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conducted. MS100 was then declared operable. This removed the unit from the action statement of Technical Specifications 3.6.3.1 and 3.7.1.5. To ensure proper operation, a leak test will be performed if MS100 or MS101 are disassembled in the future.

Failure Data: There have been no previously recorded failures of either main steam isolation valves.

LER #83-003