

REPORT DATED 9/18/82

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 1 | L | S | C | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5  
8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 58

CONT

0 1 | L | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 9  
3 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

Dampers OVE07YA and OVE09YA would not operate manually. Upon inspection OVE09YA was found to have a blown oil seal which could not be rapidly repaired. Probable consequences were minimal, because another VE train was operational and the subject dampers failed to the open position, so that "A" train could have been used in an emergency

0 9 | A | A | 11 | E | 12 | B | 13 | V | A | L | V | O | P | 14 | C | 15 | X | 16  
7 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 10 11 CAUSE CODE 12 13 CAUSE SUBCODE 14 15 COMPONENT CODE 16 17 COMP. SUBCODE 18 19 VALVE SUBCODE 20  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 EVENT YEAR 22 23 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 25 OCCURRENCE CODE 26 27 REPORT TYPE 28 29 REVISION NO. 30 31  
ACTION TAKEN 32 FUTURE ACTION 33 EFFECT ON PLANT 34 SHUTDOWN METHOD 35 HOURS 36 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 37 NPRO-4 FORM SUB. 38 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 39 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 40  
0 18 | D | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | A | 25 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 7  
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The blown oil seal prevented the unit from operating properly by depressurizing the unit the damper actuators were repaired in accordance with work request L17464 and shop tested satisfactorily. LIS-VC-03 was performed with satisfactory result, to verify proper operation of the dampers manually.

1 5 | B | 28 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 29 | NA | 30 | NA | 31 | NA | 32  
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS 10 % POWER 11 OTHER STATUS 12 13 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 14 15 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 16 17  
1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36  
7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT 10 RELEASED OF RELEASE 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 12 13 LOCATION OF RELEASE 14 15  
1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39  
7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 10 NUMBER 11 TYPE 12 DESCRIPTION 13 14  
1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41  
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES 10 NUMBER 11 DESCRIPTION 12 13  
1 9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43  
7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 10 TYPE 11 DESCRIPTION 12 13  
2 0 | N | 44 | 45  
7 8 9 PUBLICITY 10 ISSUED DESCRIPTION 11 12  
8302250228 830209  
PDR ADOCK 05000373  
S PDR  
NRC USE ONLY  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30  
R. Tolbert  
PHONE: (815) 357-6761 Ext. 290

- I. LER NUMBER: 82-067/03X-1
- II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit 1
- III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373/374
- IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On July 22, 1982, at 1215 hours, the "A" train of the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (VE) HVAC system was shut down and taken out of service to repair charcoal filter isolation dampers OVE07YA and OVE09YA, in accordance with Work Request L17464. Upon investigation, it was found that a seal in the actuator of damper OVE09YA had failed. After wiring both dampers open, their "fail-safe" position, the actuators were removed and transported to the Electrical Maintenance shop for repair. No spare seals were held in stores, so rapid repair of the actuator could not be effected. The system was declared inoperable on July 22, 1982, at 1825 hours, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.2.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT:

The probable consequences of the event were minimal, based on the following factors:

- 1) The "B" train of the VE system was fully operable, and was utilized while the "A" train was being repaired.
- 2) Charcoal filter isolation dampers OVE07YA and OVE09YA were wired open, their "fail-safe" position, so that in an emergency situation the "A" train could have been operated, if needed.

During the course of the event a reactor startup was in progress. Upon reviewing the system status, in preparation for the startup, it was determined that the system was technically not inoperable in the configuration it was in, since the "A" train would have performed its function satisfactorily, if required. Consequently, the startup was continued.

The plant was maintained in a safe condition at all times and there was no threat to the health and safety of the public.

VI. CAUSE:

Upon inspection, actuator OFZ-VE007A (damper OVE07YA) had no indication of hydraulic oil leakage or electrical malfunction. Actuator OFZ-VE007B (damper OVE09YA) was found to have a damaged upper piston seal. This seal isolates the hydraulic piston cylinder from the control plate. Failure of this seal allowed hydraulic oil to escape from the piston cylinder, resulting in de-pressurizing the unit. This de-pressurization returned the damper to its failed state.

VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Both actuators were disassembled, cleaned, repaired as necessary and then reassembled in accordance with Work Request L17464. The actuators were shop tested satisfactorily and reinstalled in the system. Dampers OVE07YA and OVE09YA were then tested in accordance with LIS-VC-03, with satisfactory results.

No apparent cause for the failure of damper OVE07YA could be discovered.

The upper piston seal on damper OVE09YA failed because of many hours of usage. No generic problem or defect seems evident.

Prepared by: R. E. Tolbert