



GPU Nuclear

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

February 15, 1983

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-03/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-03/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:jal
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-03/03L

Report date

February 15, 1983

Occurrence date

January 18, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

"A" Control Rod Drive (CRD) pump was taken out of service for maintenance. This condition constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation as specified in Technical Specification paragraph 3.4.D.2. While performing maintenance on "A" CRD pump, a vent line on the pump was broken off. This resulted in the wetdown of NZOIA core spray pump and the inadvertent trip of "B" CRD pump. Core spray pump NZOIA was removed from service temporarily, which constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation specified in Technical Specification paragraph 3.4.A.4.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power:

Reactor Power	931 MWt
Generator Output	250 MWe
Mode Switch Position	Run

Description of Occurrence

"A" CRD pump was removed from service in order to torque the pump casing nuts. While performing this function, a pump vent line was broken off. The break caused a discharge of water from the pump vent line. The mechanic, to avoid the discharging water, quickly moved away from the pump. During this movement, the low suction pressure switch for "B" CRD pump was disturbed. The "B" CRD pump tripped as a result. The control room operator noticed the shutdown and immediately restarted "B" CRD pump.

The discharged water from "A" CRD pump vent line fell on NZOIA core spray pump which is located on a floor level beneath the "A" CRD pump. Core spray pump NZOIA was removed from service to megger the pump motor for possible water damage.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

"A" CRD pump was removed from service to torque the pump casing nuts. This was done in an attempt to stop a slight leak emanating from a pump casing bolt. The broken vent line resulted in the wetting down of NZOIA core spray pump, which is directly below "A" CRD pump.

In an attempt to avoid the vent line discharge from "A" CRD pump, the mechanic inadvertently disturbed the low suction pressure switch resulting in the trip of "B" CRD pump.

Analysis of Occurrence

The CRD pump supplies control rod drive cooling water, accumulator charging and rod maneuvering pressure as well as make-up water to the reactor core. For pipe break sizes up to 0.002 ft.², the flow from a single CRD pump is adequate for maintaining the reactor vessel water level above the core, thus alleviating the need for actuation of the Auto Depressurization System and core spray initiation.

The intended function of the Core Spray System is to provide cooling water to the fuel assemblies in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The Core Spray System consists of two identical systems, each of which contain two redundant loops. Each of the loops have both a main and booster pump and associated piping and valves necessary to meet the design flow of the system. This event was limited to the loss of a single active component in one of the core spray loops.

As the redundant "B" CRD pump was immediately restarted after its trip and remained operating, and as the redundant core spray system was operable and the redundant core spray pump in the affected loop was demonstrated to be operable as required by Technical Specification 3.4.A.4, the safety significance is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to restart 'B' CRD pump after its trip. Core spray pump NZOIA was removed from service to perform a megger check of the pump motor to assess possible water damage. Core spray pump NZOIA and 'A' CRD pump were subsequently returned to service.

An evaluation has been initiated to provide a means of preventing the inadvertent wetting of the core spray pumps below the CRD pumps.

Failure Data

None