

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	C	B	E	P	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35											
LICENSEE CODE															LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE										CAT 58				

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	-	0	3	2	5	7	0	1	1	4	8	3	8									9					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35					
CON'T		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE									

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During the ongoing Unit No. 1 refueling outage, required ASME Section XI laboratory

0 3 testing of SRVs revealed six of the 11 valves opened at higher than specified set-

0 4 points. These valves, 1-B21-F013B, D, E, F, K, and L, which opened at pressures

0 5 ranging from 1126 to 1158 psig, are of the two stage pilot operated design. This

0 6 event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

0 7

0 8 Technical Specifications 3.4.2, 6.9.1.9b

0	9	S	H	11	E	12	B	13	V	A	L	B	E	X	14	F	15	B	16									
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LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE								COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		SEQUENTIA		OCCURREN		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		
17		8 3		11		12		14								15		16		24		28		30		32		
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER												
18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26												
C		X		Z		Z		0 0 0		Y		Y		N		T 0 2 0												

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Corrosion buildup on the pilot disc and seat surfaces of each subject valve prevented

1 1 them from opening at their specified setpoints. The valve vendor will inspect, repair,

1 2 and adjust each subject valve to set pressure requirements and the valves, Model No.

1 3 7567F, will be returned to service. Following the completion of qualification testing

1 4 by the valve vendor appropriate future correction action to the event will be taken.

1	5	H	28	0	0	0	29	NA	30	B	31	Periodic Testing	32															
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION																				
15		28		29		30		31		32																		
ACTIVITY TAKEN		CONTENT		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE																						
16		33		34		35		36																				
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION																						
17		37		38		39																						
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION																						
18		40		41		42																						
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION																								
19		43		44		45																						

1	9	Z	42																									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
PUBLICATION		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY																								
20		44		8302240251 830215																								
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		PDR ADOCK 05000325																								
20		44		S PDR																								

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PHONE: 919-457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-2

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1

Event Date: January 14, 1983

ASME Section XI laboratory testing of Unit No. 1 SRVs revealed six of the 11 valves, Target Rock Corporation Model No. 7567F, opened in excess of their individual set pressures.

<u>Valve No.</u>	<u>Set Pressure (psig)</u>	<u>Opening Pressure (psig as tested)</u>
1-B21-F013B	1125	1150
1-B21-F013D	1105	1119
1-B21-F013E	1105	1157
1-B21-F013F	1095	1126
1-B21-F013K	1115	1134
1-B21-F013L	1125	1158

Corrosion buildup on the pilot disc and seat of each subject valve caused binding between the two components which prevented the subject valves from opening at their specified setpoints. A contributory factor to this problem also results from the valves' pilot rod and guide areas being constructed of stellite No. 6 which, used together, possess a high coefficient of friction. This phenomenon has been observed with two-stage SPVs in other operating plants which have not been cycled for extended periods of time (in excess of three months).

These valves will be repaired by the vendor and reinstalled and returned to service. The BWR owners group is currently investigating problems encountered with two-stage SRVs. Vendor proposed solutions to these problems, which involve replacing the pilot disc material with one less susceptible to corrosion and replacement of the pilot rod bushing material with a carbon type bushing, are endorsed by the BWR owner's group. The proposed solutions to these problems are currently undergoing qualification testing by the vendor. Following the satisfactory completion of this testing, a decision will then be made as to the implementation of these proposed solutions with respect to the SRVs of both Unit Nos. 1 and 2.