

WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

John A. Bailey
Vice President
Operations

April 2, 1991


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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Special Report 91-002

The attached Special Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 concerning an invalid failure of Emergency Diesel Generator "A".

Very truly yours,



John A. Bailey
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SPECIAL REPORT 91-002

Invalid Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator "A"

This report describes an invalid failure of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" which occurred on March 4, 1991. This report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

On March 1, 1991, at 1842 hours, EDG "A" was taken out of service for maintenance. Following completion of the maintenance on March 4, 1991, surveillance procedure STS KJ-005A, "Manual/Auto Start, Synchronization, and Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator NE01", was commenced to prove operability of EDG "A" prior to placing it back in service. The EDG was started at 1252 hours and at 1300 hours the operator closed the EDG output breaker and attempted to apply load. However, instead of adjusting the governor speed control switch to apply load, as stated in the surveillance procedure, the operator mistakenly adjusted the voltage regulator switch. This resulted in the EDG output breaker tripping on reverse power. The operator immediately discovered his error, readjusted the voltage, reset and reclosed the output breaker and applied load with the governor speed control switch in accordance with the procedure.

The EDG was operated at full load for one hour and the surveillance procedure was successfully completed. Following completion of the surveillance procedure, EDG "A" was declared operable at 1447 hours on March 4, 1991. This event had no effect on the reliability or availability of the EDG.

ROOT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The root cause of this event was the failure of the operator to verify he was adjusting the correct switch before adding load to the EDG. This resulted in the output breaker opening on reverse power. This function protects the generator from motoring when connected to an energized bus. The Manager of Operations has discussed this event with the operator. The operator stated he was aware of the correct switch to use, the switch was clearly labeled, and the correct switch was clearly stated in the procedure. Due to the need to quickly add load to the EDG once the output breaker is closed, the operator failed to take time to verify he was operating the correct switch.

Operators have been reminded of the importance of self-verification prior to operation of equipment. This, along with information currently in the surveillance procedure and current operator training ensures the potential for additional trips of the EDG output breaker on reverse power due to operator error is minimized.

FAILURE CLASSIFICATION

The EDG output breaker reverse power trip function is not required and does not operate in the emergency operating mode. Therefore, the unsuccessful load attempt discussed in this report is considered to be an invalid test and failure in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1. It does not affect the current surveillance test interval of 31 days as required by Table 4.8-1 of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1. Through March 4, 1991, there have been a total of 103 successful valid tests, three valid failures, and 12 invalid failures of EDG "A". From the time of the last valid failure of EDG "A" on December 11, 1987, EDG "A" has undergone 60 successful valid tests. The last invalid failure of EDG "A" occurred on October 21, 1985.