

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346

UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1

DATE December 15, 1982

COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba

TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 196

MONTH November, 1982

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	<u>852</u>
2	<u>870</u>
3	<u>870</u>
4	<u>873</u>
5	<u>870</u>
6	<u>871</u>
7	<u>871</u>
8	<u>323</u>
9	<u>439</u>
10	<u>801</u>
11	<u>863</u>
12	<u>866</u>
13	<u>872</u>
14	<u>868</u>
15	<u>877</u>
16	<u>879</u>

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
17	<u>882</u>
18	<u>881</u>
19	<u>875</u>
20	<u>875</u>
21	<u>873</u>
22	<u>874</u>
23	<u>877</u>
24	<u>878</u>
25	<u>878</u>
26	<u>878</u>
27	<u>877</u>
28	<u>878</u>
29	<u>878</u>
30	<u>877</u>
31	<u>---</u>

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

8301270200 821215
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R PDR

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346
DATE December 15, 1982
COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000,
Ext. 196

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: November, 1982
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 918
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 874
8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

Notes

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): _____
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: _____

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	720	8,016	38,017
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	713.6	3,921.5	20,151.5
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	6.4	29.4	3,364.1
14. Hours Generator On-Line	701.1	3,780.0	19,030.2
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0.0	1.1	1,732.5
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	1,889,111	8,324,585	43,446,110
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	634,838	2,776,805	14,459,006
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	603,233	2,604,208	13,501,493
19. Unit Service Factor	97.3	47.2	50.1
20. Unit Availability Factor	97.3	47.2	54.6
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	95.9	37.2	40.6
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	92.5	35.9	39.2
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	2.6	1.3	21.2

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: _____

26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

INITIAL CRITICALITY
INITIAL ELECTRICITY
COMMERCIAL OPERATION

Forecast

Achieved

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

REPORT MONTH November, 1982

DOCKET NO. 50-346
 UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1
 DATE December 15, 1982
 COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba
 TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 196

No.	Date	Type ¹	Duration (Hours)	Reason ²	Method of Shutting Down Reactor ³	Licensee Event Report #	System Code ⁴	Component Code ⁵	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
8.	82 11 08	F	18.9	A	3	NA	HJ	INSTRU	Reactor tripped due to the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) caused by an erroneous moisture separator reheater high water level signal.

¹
 F: Forced
 S: Scheduled

²
 Reason:
 A-Equipment Failure (Explain)
 B-Maintenance or Test
 C-Refueling
 D-Regulatory Restriction
 E-Operator Training & License Examination
 F-Administrative
 G-Operational Error (Explain)
 H-Other (Explain)

³
 Method:
 1-Manual
 2-Manual Scram.
 3-Automatic Scram.
 4-Continuation from Previous Month
 5-Load Reduction
 9-Other (Explain)

⁴
 Exhibit G - Instructions
 for Preparation of Data
 Entry Sheets for Licensee
 Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-
 0161)

⁵
 Exhibit I - Same Source

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
November, 1982

11/1/82 - 11/7/82

Reactor power was increased to approximately 98% of full power and maintained at this level.

11/8/82

At 0938 hours on November 8, 1982, an erroneous moisture separator reheater (MSR) high water level signal caused a turbine trip. The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) then tripped the reactor from a power level of approximately 100% full power. The MSR #1 high level turbine trip switch was replaced, and the reactor was critical again at 1603 hours the same day.

1 |

11/9/82 - 11/30/82

The turbine-generator was synchronized on line at 0435 hours on November 9, 1982. Reactor power was increased to approximately full power and maintained for the rest of the month.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 77-006

SYSTEM: Miscellaneous

COMPONENT: Control Room Vertical Panels

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 77-006 proposed the fabrication and installation of covers for the east and south ends of the vertical panels in the Control Room.

REASON FOR CHANGE: On July 19, 1977, these panels were installed to close the east and south ends of these panels.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The added vertical panel covers will in no way affect the safety function of the Control Room panels, nor were the seismic qualifications affected.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 78-315

SYSTEM: Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS)

COMPONENT: SFAS wiring for CC 1407B

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: On June 26, 1978, the internal wire connected to pin "K" of J208 and J408 connectors was rerouted through the spare wire linking pin "c" of the same connectors.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Wires connected to pin "K" of J208 and J408 connectors showed discontinuity along Channels 2 and 4 of SFAS. This discontinuity prevented actuation of L422B and L424B logic modules, which in turn prevented the Component Cooling Return Header Containment, Outer Isolation, Motor Actuated Butterfly Valve, CC1407B from closing. The problem was caused by the defective wire attached to pin "K".

SAFETY EVALUATION: Facility Change Request 78-315 provided for the change of an internal cabinet connection wire in Channels 2 and 4 of SFAS. The wire would be replaced by a good wire which would enable actuation of CC1407B as required by SFAS.

Replacing the wires does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 79-213

SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generators

COMPONENT: Cabinets C-3617 and C-3618

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: On May 1, 1980, new relays, relay sockets, and diodes were installed and tested to enable proper annunciator action for the SCR Diode Failure Exciter Regulator Alarm.

REASON FOR CHANGE: When running the Diesel Generator, the SCR Diode Failure Alarm is on, however, there are no red lights (which indicate an alarm) on the SCR diodes. Several resistors and relays for this alarm have failed, and it is believed this happens because of a design problem in the circuit.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This FCR consists of installing new relays, relay sockets, and diodes associated with the SCR Diode Failure Exciter Regulator Alarm.

This change will not affect the safety function of the Emergency Diesel Generators. It will improve the reliability of the annunciator alarm circuit.

The modifications are internal to Cabinets C-3617 and C-3618 and will not prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.

All work involved with this package has been done under the supervision of the vendor. Installation in accordance with the vendor's instructions is to insure no adverse environment is created. An unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 80-018

SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater System

COMPONENT: Rooms 237 and 238

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 80-018 proposed the installation of a 6" curb around the penetrations through the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room ceiling.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Installation of the curb prevented excessive water on the heater bay floor from draining to the Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms directly below and causing damage to equipment.

Work was completed June 6, 1982.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-018 involved the installation of curbing around three (3) existing core drills on the floor of the heater bay area. The curbing would prevent possible water damage to equipment in Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms located below the heater bay area.

No new adverse environments were created and an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 80-275

SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generators

COMPONENT: Turbochargers

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: New turbochargers with a high contact drive gear were installed on the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) per FCR 80-275. The work was completed June 30, 1982.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Former turbochargers were being replaced every 200 operating hours. The new high capacity turbocharger would increase the life span to approximately 3000 operating hours.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-275 provided for changes to the turbocharger of each EDG. The new turbocharger has thicker gears to reduce contact stress level and increase contact ratio to better distribute torque. This turbocharger was intended to increase EDG reliability without affecting its safety function. No new adverse environment was created.

An unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 81-060

SYSTEM: Emergency Diesel Generator

COMPONENT: Lube Oil Coolers

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 81-060 proposed the installation of rolled type lube oil cooler cores to replace presently installed soldered cores.

REASON FOR CHANGE: FCR 81-060 was implemented following reports of lube oil cooler leaks at other nuclear generating stations. Leaks were caused by a corrosive attack of the soldered joints on the cooler core.

Work was completed and inspected on Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 on April 7, 1982 and on Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 on April 17, 1982.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 81-060 involved the Emergency Diesel Generators which are required for safe plant shutdown in the event of loss of offsite power. This aforesaid change does not affect the performance of the coolers, nor does it affect the capability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to perform their safety function. This change improved the reliability of the lube oil coolers and thus improved the reliability of the Emergency Diesel Generators.

No new adverse environments were created.

An unreviewed safety question does not exist.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 82-025

SYSTEM: 125/250 Volt D.C.

COMPONENT: Battery Charger DBC-2N

CHANGE, TEXT OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 82-025 proposed the temporary operation of Battery Charger DBC-2N with only 42 of the total 43 filter capacitors in service.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The aforesaid Battery Charger DBC-2N was needed in order to facilitate the outage testing of the batteries as well as act as a replacement charger in the event of failure on DC MCC2. Since the replacement filter capacitor was on order and not available, the one filter capacitor that had failed was unable to be repaired.

Work was completed March 5, 1982 and represented a corrective action for Non-Conformance Report 159-82.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 82-025 provided for the temporary operation of Battery Charger DBC-2N without its full complement of filter capacitors. Use continued until a replacement for the faulty capacitor was installed August 5, 1982.

The safety function of the filter capacitor banks are to reduce the output ripple voltage of the battery charger. The loss of one filter capacitor from the total of 43 did not adversely affect the function of DBC-2N. The modification is internal to Battery Charger DBC-2N and did not prevent the safe shutdown of the station.

FCR 82-025 does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and, further, created no new adverse environments.