

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

December 13, 1982

AS: 54

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 . NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT  
50-327/82-18, 50-328/82-18 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATION


Please refer to OIE inspection report from D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris dated August 20, 1982 citing TVA with one Severity Level IV Violation. At the request of D. Quick of your staff, enclosed is our revised response to the subject inspection report. Our previous response was submitted to you in a letter from D. S. Kammer dated September 16, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.  
50-327/82-18 AND 50-328/82-18  
D. M. VERRELLI'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS  
DATED AUGUST 20, 1982

327/82-18-01 and 328/82-18-01

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures or drawings. Paragraph 17.2.5 of TVA-TR75-1 "Quality Assurance Program Description," the licensee's approved quality assurance program, states that procedures, instructions, and drawings shall be developed to prescribe those activities that affect the safety-related function of critical systems, structures, and components (CSSC).

Contrary to the above, activities affecting the safety-related function of CSSC were not accomplished in accordance with drawings in that on July 12, 1982 it was determined that 10-amp control power fuses were installed in the control circuit of the B train Control Room Emergency Pressurization Fan instead of 1-amp fuses as designated in drawing 45N779-21 R-14. The improperly sized fuses caused a minor component failure which resulted in a prolonged unavailability of the fan and two small fires in a safety-related switchboard.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.D.2). This violation applies to both units.

1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

2. Reasons for the Violation if Admitted

At 1325 on July 8, 1982, after initiation of the control room emergency ventilation system, the control transformer to the control building emergency pressurizer fan failed causing a trip of the 1B1-B control and auxiliary vent board. On July 12, 1982 a replacement control transformer was installed, but this transformer also shorted following energizing the fan. Investigation discovered a defective relay in the fan control circuit. Further investigation revealed a 10-amp fuse was installed in the control transformer, but the drawing required a 1-amp fuse. Installation of the improperly-sized fuse has been attributed to personnel error during construction installation for the first failed transformer. Since the 10-amp fuse did not fail in the first transformer, maintenance personnel did not refer to the drawing for required fuse size. This resulted in the second transformer failure.

3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved

A nameplate has been installed at the control transformer stating to use a 1-amp fuse. A spot-check of other control transformers was performed to ensure all had the correct size fuses installed. One hundred additional control transformer fuses will be checked to ensure they have the correct fuse size installed by January 1, 1983.

4. Corrective Steps Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

A concerted effort to compare all fuses protecting safety-related equipment against the controlled as-constructed drawings to ensure proper sizing of all fuses will begin following the end of the present refueling outage on unit 1. Nameplates will also be installed alongside each fuse box indicating the correct fuse size.

5. Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved

Full compliance was achieved on July 12, 1982 when the correct size fuse was installed in the transformer to the control building emergency pressurizer fan. The program of checking safety-related equipment fuses against the drawings and installing nameplates will be 50 percent complete by September 1, 1983 and will be 100 percent complete by July 1, 1984.