



**LOUISIANA**  
**POWER & LIGHT**

142 DELARONDE STREET  
P. O. BOX 6008 • NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174 • (504) 366-2345

December 21, 1982

L. V. MAURIN  
Vice President Nuclear Operations

W3I82-0139  
Q-3-A35.07.58

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3  
Docket No. 50-382  
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 58  
"Cable Tray Fire in RAB at Elevation 35'"  
Final Report

REFERENCE: LP&L letter W3K82-0496 dated August 6, 1982

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 58, "Cable Tray Fire in RAB at Elevation 35'."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

L. V. Maurin

LVM/MAL:keh

cc: 1) Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555  
(with 15 copies of report)

3) E. Blake

2) Director  
Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555  
(with 1 copy of report)

4) W. Stevenson

IE-27

8301030173 821221  
PDR ADOCK 05000382  
S PDR

FINAL REPORT OF  
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 58  
"CABLE TRAY FIRE IN RAB AT ELEVATION 35'"

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a fire affecting Class 1E Control Cables in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge it has not been reported pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

On July 12, 1982, at approximately 10:50 A.M., a fire was discovered in cable tray C201M-SA between plan points 1936 and 1935. The fire resulted from an ignited piece of cardboard resting on the cables. The cable tray area affected by the fire was not more than two feet in length and less than the full width of the tray. The cable tray contained 105 cables, of which 30 were visibly damaged to varying degrees. Cables in the upper layer received the most damage. Their jackets were charred and fell off in portions, exposing the insulated conductors. However, in no case was damage to the insulation sufficient to expose the copper conductor.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The damaged cables are part of Class 1E cable system and if left uncorrected, the safety related equipment served by these cables could be adversely affected. The deficiency is, therefore, reportable.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Non-Conformance Report W3-4098 was initiated to document and track corrective action. Of the 30 damaged cables, 13 cables were considered unacceptable for Class 1E use; these were identified and replaced. The remaining 17 cables exhibited partial jacket chars, but there was no noticeable embrittlement of either the insulation or the jacket material in the affected areas. In order to determine whether the cable insulation was degraded or aged as a result of exposure to the fire, samples from cables that were damaged and others that might have been affected were tested by the cable manufacturer. Testing confirmed that the insulation of the cable samples sustained no damage. Consequently, jacket repairs to the remaining cables were made as needed, reference FCR E-2064. A 20% sample of the undamaged cables was meggered and continuity tested. All replaced cable, repaired cable, and original undamaged cable was found to be acceptable.

Reference Ebasco letter No. F-59065E dated July 21, 1982. All contractors were instructed by the referenced letter from R. T. Watt, Ebasco Contract Manager, warning of the cause of the cable tray fire and instructed contractors to hold

weekly meetings, instructing work forces how to protect and maintain cleanliness on plant equipment to preclude recurrence. Unscheduled inspection of randomly selected plant areas indicated instruction to be effective. All corrective action on NCR W3-4098 was completed, reviewed, accepted and closed on December 6, 1982.

This report is submitted as the Final Report.