

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
/0/1/ REPORT
SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /1/2/0/6/8/2/ (8) /1/2/2/0/8/2/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On December 6, 1982, with Unit 1 in Hot Standby it was discovered that both /
/0/3/ / trains of automatic safety injection (SI) were blocked for 22 hours and 30 /
/0/4/ / minutes following an inadvertent SI. The SI procedure, 1-EP-5, allows automatic /
/0/5/ / SI signals to be blocked for up to 30 hours following an SI which is contrary to /
/0/6/ / T.S. Table 3.3-3 Action Statement 13 and T.S. 3.0.3. This event is reportable /
/0/7/ / pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.8.f. Manual SI initiation remained operable. The public /
/0/8/ / health and safety were not affected. /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /S/F/ (11) /D/ (12) /Z/ (13) /Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14) /Z/ (15) /Z/ (16)
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
REPORT" NO.
NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/8/2/ / / /0/1/ /T/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
/X/ (18) /G/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /Z/ (25) /Z/9/9/9/
(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The Safety Injection Emergency procedure mislead operators and allowed automatic /
/1/1/ / safety injection signals to be blocked for 22 hours and 30 minutes. The auto SI /
/1/2/ / block was reset. Procedure changes will be made. The T.S. do not address block- /
/1/3/ / ing of both trains of automatic SI after initiation of an SI. Since the block is /
/1/4/ / a necessary design feature, a T.S. change will be requested. /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /G/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /
8212300220 821221
PDR ADOCK 05000338
S PDR

PUBLICITY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT

PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 82-082/01T-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 2

Description of Event

On December 6, 1982, with Unit 1 in Hot Standby following an inadvertent SI on December 5, both trains of automatic SI were unblocked for 22 hours and 30 minutes. T.S. Table 3.3-3 does not allow both trains of automatic safety injection to be inoperable in Mode 3. Because Emergency Procedure 1-EP-5, "Safety Injection", implied that T.S. allowed both trains of automatic safety injection to be in operable for up to 30 hours, the automatic SI block signal was not reset. This event is reportable pursuant to 6.9.1.8.f.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Safety injection was not required. Had safety injection been required, manual initiation of safety was available. The health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The protection system is designed to prevent additional automatic safety injections after an automatic safety injection event to allow operators to control safety equipment. The automatic SI block is reset when the reactor trip breakers are reclosed.

On December 5, 1982 a Unit 1 inadvertent safety injection event "set" the automatic safety injection block. The Safety Injection Emergency Procedure, 1-EP-5, implied that the automatic safety block required resetting within 30 hours after safety injection initiation.

Action Statement 13 of T.S. Table 3.3-3 requires that the plant be placed in "...at least Hot Standby within 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours..." when one of two trains of automatic safety injection are inoperable. The Action Statement does not address having both trains of automatic safety injection signals inoperable; therefore T.S. 3.0.3 becomes the limiting condition of operation.

Immediate Corrective Action

The automatic safety injection block was reset by cycling the reactor trip breakers.

Scheduled Corrective Action

Emergency procedures will be revised to include a step in the safety injection securing instructions to cycle the reactor trip breakers. Cycling the reactor trip breaker will reset the automatic safety injection block.

The automatic safety injection block feature of the protection system is a necessary feature. Without the automatic safety injection block, operators would be unable to reset safety injection and control safety equipment with a safety injection signal locked in. The Technical Specifications do not address the block of both trains of automatic safety injection which occurs after safety injection initiation. A Technical Specification change request will be made, describing the actions to be taken in the event that both trains of automatic safety injection are blocked following a safety injection.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions, other than those already described, are required to prevent recurrence.

Generic Implications

This event has no generic implications.