

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /1/1/2/8/8/2/ (8) /1/2/2/0/8/2/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On November 28, 1982, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 a Containment Isolation Service Air /
/0/3/ / Valve (manual valve located outside the containment) was found open and unatten- /
/0/4/ / ded. Since the redundant Service Air Isolation valve (located inside the con- /
/0/5/ / tainment) was closed and locked, the public health and safety were not affected. /
/0/6/ / This event is contrary to T.S. 3.6.3.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b./
/0/7/ /
/0/8/ /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /S/D/ (11) /A/ (12) /X/ (13) /V/A/L/V/E/X (14) /E/ (15) /D/ (16)
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
REPORT NO. NO.
(17) NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/8/0/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/X/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /V/1/3/5/
(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The reason for the Service Air Containment Isolation Valve being open could not /
/1/1/ / be determined. The valve in question was closed and locked. The redundant /
/1/2/ / Service Air Isolation Valve was checked and found closed and locked. /
/1/3/ /
/1/4/ /

FACILITY METHOD OF
STATUS ZPOWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /G/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) 8212300130 821220
TYPE DESCRIPTION PDR ADOCK 05000338
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA / S PDR

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 82-080/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 2

Description of Event

On November 28, 1982, with Unit 1 in Mode 3, the outside containment Isolation Service Air Valve was found open and unattended. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.6.3.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The operability of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere with pressurization of the containment. Since the redundant Service Air Containment Isolation Valve was closed and locked and would have served to mitigate any release outside the containment through the service air header, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The cause of this event could not be determined. Subsequent to finding the containment isolation valve unlocked, open and unattended, an investigation was undertaken to determine the cause of this event. This investigation included a review of operational and periodic test procedures that verify containment integrity prior to startup, Action Statement Logs, Control Room Operator and Senior Operator Logs, Auxiliary Building Logs and Containment Entry logs. Discussions were also held with at least one individual from each group making a containment entry in order to determine if any maintenance evolution required the use of service air in the containment. No reference to the valve in question was found in any log except for the Action Statement Log which was cleared (indicating the valve in its correct position) on November 14, 1982. On November 13 the valve in question was verified closed and locked on a containment integrity surveillance procedure. Again on November 14, the valve was verified closed and locked on a Containment Integrity Operational procedure. Discussion with operations and maintenance personnel concerning the operation of the Service Air Valve yielded no additional information.

Immediate Corrective Action

The valve in question was closed and locked. The redundant isolation valve (located inside the containment) was also verified closed and locked. Subsequently, an investigation was undertaken to determine the reason for the valve being open and unattended (see Cause of Event).

Scheduled Corrective Action

Scheduled corrective action will be to emphasize to station personnel the importance of maintaining administratively controlled valves in their assigned positions. A review of the administrative control of locked valves had been initiated prior to this event. This review will be completed and any deficiencies identified will be corrected.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

A thorough investigation indicated the valve was unlocked and opened sometime between November 15, and 28, 1982. No reason for this action occurring can be found.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.