

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
 /0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/7/1/9/8/2/ (8) /0/8/0/2/8/2/ (9)
 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / With the unit defueled, liquid samples were not taken from the Reactor Coolant /
 /0/3/ / System between April 2, 1982 and April 12, 1982. The Surveillance Requirements /
 /0/4/ / specify that the minimum analysis frequency of sampling once per 72 hours shall /
 /0/5/ / apply at all times. Since the stress corrosion process caused by chlorides and /
 /0/6/ / florides is inhibited at ambient temperature conditions and since the analyses /
 /0/7/ / performed on the above dates were below the steady state limits, the health and /
 /0/8/ / safety of the general public were not affected. /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/C/B/ (11)	/X/ (12)	/Z/ (13)	/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14)
			/Z/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE
			REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/4/6/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
 /Z/ (18) /X/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /Z/ (25) /Z/9/9/9/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / Reactor Coolant samples could not be obtained since the RCS and RHR System were /
 /1/1/ / drained and the upper internals were in the reactor vessel preventing the removal /
 /1/2/ / of dip samples. On July 16, 1982, relief was granted from the surveillance re- /
 /1/3/ / quirement on Unit 1 when the RCS is drained below the reactor vessel nozzle and /
 /1/4/ / the internals and/or head are in place. Similar relief is expected on Unit 2. /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/H/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ Defueled / (30)	/Z/ (31) / NA /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/	/Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/	/N/ (44) / NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-338
Attachment to LER 82-046/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

With the unit defueled, liquid samples were not taken from the Reactor Coolant System between April 2, 1982 and April 12, 1982. The Surveillance Requirements specify that the minimum analysis frequency of sampling once per 72 hours shall apply at all times. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.4.7 and was determined reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b on July 19, 1982.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since the stress corrosion process caused by chlorides and fluorides is inhibited at ambient temperature conditions and since the analysis performed on April 2, 1982 and April 12, 1982, were below the steady state limits specified on Table 3.4-2, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

Reactor Coolant samples could not have been obtained without significant radiation exposure since the RCS and RHR Systems were drained and the upper internals were installed in the reactor vessel preventing the removal of dip samples. The radiation level above the reactor vessel was extremely high since the refueling cavity was dry and attempts to obtain a liquid sample would not have been consistent with the ALARA program.

Immediate Corrective Action

There was no immediate corrective action.

Scheduled Corrective Action

On July 16, 1982 relief was granted by the NRC from the surveillance requirements on Unit 1 when the RCS is drained below the reactor vessel nozzle and the internals and/or head are in place. Similar relief is expected on Unit 2.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

The scheduled Corrective Action will prevent recurrence.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.