

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK:										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>ARAN02</div> <div>00-0000-00</div> <div>0341111</div> <div>05</div> </div>										<div> <div>LICENSEE CODE</div> <div>LICENSE NUMBER</div> <div>LICENSE TYPE</div> <div>CAT 58</div> </div>									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>050003687061182070882</div> <div>09</div> </div>										<div> <div>REPORT SOURCE</div> <div>DOCKET NUMBER</div> <div>EVENT DATE</div> <div>REPORT DATE</div> </div>									
<div> <div>02</div> <div>On June 11, 1982, while in Mode 2 during the approach to criticality, the</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>03</div> <div>supply breaker for battery charger 2D31 tripped. Again, on June 21, 1982,</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>04</div> <div>while in Mode 1 at 100% full power, the supply breaker for 2D31 tripped.</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>05</div> <div>Also, on June 22, 1982, while in Mode 1 at 100% full power, the supply</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>06</div> <div>breaker for battery charger 2D34 tripped. In each instance, redundant</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>07</div> <div>battery bus 2D02 was operable and available. Per T.S. 3.8.2.3, for the</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>08</div> <div>June 11, 1982, occurrence, 2D31 was secured and 2D34 was placed in</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>09</div> <div> <div> <div>EB</div> <div>B</div> <div>A</div> <div>CKTB</div> <div>RK</div> <div>A</div> <div>Z</div> </div> <div> <div>11</div> <div>12</div> <div>13</div> <div>14</div> <div>15</div> <div>16</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>17</div> <div> <div> <div>82</div> <div>023</div> <div>03</div> <div>L</div> <div>0</div> </div> <div> <div>21</div> <div>22</div> <div>23</div> <div>24</div> <div>25</div> <div>26</div> <div>27</div> <div>28</div> <div>29</div> <div>30</div> <div>31</div> <div>32</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>18</div> <div> <div> <div>XF</div> <div>Z</div> <div>Z</div> <div>0000</div> <div>Y</div> <div>N</div> <div>A</div> <div>I212</div> </div> <div> <div>33</div> <div>34</div> <div>35</div> <div>36</div> <div>37</div> <div>38</div> <div>39</div> <div>40</div> <div>41</div> <div>42</div> <div>43</div> <div>44</div> <div>45</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>10</div> <div>For the June 11, 1982, occurrence, field testing indicated that the</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>11</div> <div>breaker was tripping too soon. Therefore, the breaker was replaced as</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>12</div> <div>corrective action. After the June 22, 1982, occurrence the breaker was</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>13</div> <div>removed and tested in the shop. The breaker tested within manufacturers</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>14</div> <div>tolerances at this time. The breaker was re-installed, and no trips</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>15</div> <div> <div> <div>C</div> <div>00</div> <div>00</div> <div>Approach to</div> <div>A</div> <div>Operator Observation</div> </div> <div> <div>28</div> <div>29</div> <div>30</div> <div>31</div> <div>32</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div>16</div> <div> <div> <div>Z</div> <div>Z</div> <div>NA</div> <div>NA</div> </div> <div> <div>33</div> <div>34</div> <div>35</div> <div>36</div> </div> </div> </div>																			
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<div> <div>20</div> <div> <div> <div>NA</div> </div> <div> <div>45</div> </div> </div> </div>																			

NAME OF PREPARER Patrick Rogers

PHONE 501/964-3100

8207270192 820708  
PDR ADOCK 05000368  
S PDR

LET NO. 50-368/82-023/03L-0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (Continued)

service. Also per T.S.3.8.2.3, for the June 21, 1982, and the June 22, 1982, occurrences, the breakers were reset to restore power to the battery chargers. These occurrences are reportable per T.S.6.9.1.9.b.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

have occurred to the date of this report. Further testing and analysis will be performed in order to determine the root cause and long term corrective actions.