



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

July 14, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-051/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-051/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks

CC: Distribution

8207260254 820714
PDR ADDCK 05000311
S PDR

The Energy People

IER

Report Number: 82-051/03L
Report Date: 07-14-82
Occurrence Date: 06-18-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

100' Elevation Containment Air Lock - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-155.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1140.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0655 hours, June 18, 1982, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure SP(O)4.6.1.3A, an operator observed that the 100' Elevation Containment Air Lock total seal leakage was greater than the maximum allowed by the test. Based on the test data, the leakage was assumed to be past the seals on the outer door. The door was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered retroactive to the time of discovery. Subsequent investigation of the problem, however, showed that the leakage was actually past the inner door seals. The flow meter in the air line to the inner door was found to be throttled. The resulting flow restriction had given an erroneous indication of satisfactory leakage. The outer door was, in fact, operable, and was maintained closed during the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the excessive leakage was an improperly positioned seal. Personnel slamming the door had caused the seal to be forced too far into the seal groove, and resulted in improper sealing of the knife edges against the seal surface.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the Containment Building while providing a redundant barrier as part of overall containment integrity. This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Since the outer door was operable and closed, containment integrity was maintained. Consequently, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a requires:

With one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the operable air lock door closed and restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours, or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


As noted, the outer door was maintained closed, in compliance with the action statement. The inner door seal was pulled out and properly repositioned, and the surveillance was satisfactorily performed. The 100' Elevation Containment Air Lock was declared operable, and at 1140 hours, June 18, 1982, Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated.

Proper operation of the air lock doors is presently addressed in radiation worker training. Special emphasis will be placed on the importance of not slamming the doors, in view of recurrent problems with air lock seals. Signs warning personnel not to slam the doors will be installed on each door. Finally, a change to the Technical Specifications will be requested reducing pressure used to test air lock seals. The present 47 to 50 PSIG range may not accurately simulate required seal performance.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Frahm


General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-68