



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

October 8, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - SPECIAL REPORT 93-20

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the inoperability of the fire suppression water system in the auxiliary building as initially reported by telephone at 1730 Eastern daylight time (EDT) on September 27, 1993, and confirmed by facsimile on September 28, 1993, as required by Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) and (b), respectively.

Details are provided in the enclosure. This condition, which involves both Units 1 and 2, is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(c).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone K. E. Meade at (615) 843-7766.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT SPECIAL REPORT 93-20

SQN Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.1 requires that the fire suppression water system be operable through the last valve ahead of the water pressure alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe and through the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system in the auxiliary building.

Description of Condition

On September 27, 1993, at 1237 Eastern daylight time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 5 in a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 5 in a forced outage, LCO 3.7.11.1 was entered. A portion of the auxiliary building fire header was isolated, and the 2A and 2B fire pumps were removed from service in order to perform a surveillance test (i.e., flow test) on the 1A and 1B fire pumps. The test was completed, and the LCO was exited at 1825 EDT on September 27, 1993.

Corrective Actions

Appropriate compensatory action was taken to comply with Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b).

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of TS Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(c).