



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

September 28, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority)	50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77
AND DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.11.1 SPECIAL REPORT 93-18

The enclosed special follow-up report provides details concerning the inoperability of the fire suppression water system in the auxiliary building as initially reported by telephone at 1622 Eastern daylight time on September 16, 1993, in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.11.1 Action Statement (b)(2)(a) and confirmed by a facsimile on September 17, 1993. This condition involves only a portion of the auxiliary building.

Details are provided in the enclosure. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.11.1 Action Statement (b)(2)(c).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT SPECIAL REPORT 93-18

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.1 requires that the fire suppression water system be operable with a flow path capable of taking suction from the forebay and transferring the water through distribution piping with operable sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water pressure alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe, and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system required to be operable according to Specifications 3.7.11.2 and 3.7.11.4.

Description of Condition

On September 16, 1993, at 1245 Eastern daylight time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a maintenance outage, LCOs 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4 were entered.

A fire header in the auxiliary building was removed from service as a result of maintenance activities in the process of repairing and replacing leaking lines. The removal of the header from service isolated a portion of the fire protection sprinklers and standpipes in the area.

Corrective Action

Appropriate compensatory measures in the form of fire watches and a backup fire suppression water system were established before the initiation of the clearance to comply with TS Action Statements 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4. The maintenance activity was completed, and the LCOs were exited at 0150 EDT on September 19, 1993.

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of LCO 3.7.11.1 Action Statement (b)(2)(c).