NORTHEAST UTILITIES

The Connecticut Light And Power Company
Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Holyoke Water Power Company
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices · Selden Street, Berlin Connecticut

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Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

July 02, 1990

MP-90-652

U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49
Docket No. 50-423
Licensee Event Report 90-018-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 90-018-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Stephen E. Scace
Director, Millstone Station

SES/PAF:mo

Attachment: LER 90-018-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region 1 Administrator
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

Cont No P671450806

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NRC Form 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)
Improperly Established Fire Watch Due to Miscommunication

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	
0 6	0 1	9 0	9 0	0 1 8	0 0	0 7	0 2	9 0		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Peter A. Freeman, Engineer, Ext. 5322	AREA CODE 2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 2, 1990, at 1245 hours, with the plant at 100% power (Mode 1), the shift supervisor (SS) discovered that an hourly fire watch patrol had not been properly established in the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) sump area after associated fire rated assemblies had been declared inoperable. The duration of the event was approximately 26 hours.

On June 1, 1990 at approximately 1100 hours, four Fire Stop and Seal penetrations were declared inoperable in the Engineered Safety Features building (ESF) sump and the "A" Train Containment Recirculation System (RSS) pipe tunnel areas in association with a Technical Specification surveillance. An hourly firewatch patrol was established in the 4 ft. 6 in. elevation of the ESF but did not encompass the ESF sump area.

The root cause of the event was miscommunication between shift personnel which resulted in an hourly firewatch patrol signature sheet being placed in an incorrect location.

Immediate corrective action was to establish an hourly firewatch patrol in the ESF sump area. The SS has been counseled in the importance of verifying communications with shift personnel. A procedure change was made to require timely verification of fire watch patrol boundaries.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3	9 0	- 0 1 8	- 0 0	0 2 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Description of Event

On June 2, 1990, at 1245 hours, with the plant at 100% power (Mode 1), at 587 degrees Fahrenheit and 2250 psia, the shift supervisor discovered that an hourly fire watch patrol had not been properly established in the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) sump area after associated fire rated assemblies had been declared inoperable. The duration of the event was approximately 26 hours.

The unit staff improperly stationed an hourly firewatch patrol after declaring four Fire Stop and Seal penetrations in the Engineered Safety Features building (ESF) sump and "A" Train Containment Recirculation System (RSS) pipe tunnel areas located on the 4 ft. 6 in. elevation of the ESF building inoperable.

On June 1, 1990 at approximately 1100 hours, four Fire Stop and Seal penetrations were declared inoperable in the ESF sump and "A" train RSS pipe tunnel areas. This action was being taken in association with a Technical Specification surveillance involving the inspection of Fire Stop and Seal penetrations which were in progress. The Shift Supervisor (SS) assigned a non-licensed operator (PEO) to place the firewatch patrol signature sheets at the required locations (ESF 4 ft. 6 in. elevation - Sump and "A" Train RSS pipe tunnel areas). The SS assigned a PEO with this responsibility in order to minimize confusion and ensure proper location, although the evolution is normally the responsibility of firewatch patrol personnel. The PEO correctly interpreted the required locations for the signature sheets and directed fire watch personnel to place the signature sheets within the ESF building, but did not perform a verification to ensure proper placement. The signature sheets were positioned such that firewatch patrols were performed in the "A" and "B" Train RSS pipe tunnel areas located on the 4 ft. 6 in. elevation of the ESF building (see attached figure).

At approximately 1245 hours on June 2, 1990 during the performance of a shiftly firewatch patrol tour, the SS who had assigned the above described firewatch patrols discovered that the firewatch patrol signature sheets had been improperly positioned and there had been no hourly fire watch patrols encompassing the ESF sump area. An hourly firewatch patrol was immediately established in the correct location.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of the event was miscommunication between shift personnel. The Shift Supervisor (SS) assigned the responsibility of stationing the firewatch patrol signature sheets to a nonlicensed operator (PEO) to minimize the possibility of misplacement. The PEO was unaware of the SS's concerns of misplacement and did not fully understand that he had been designated the responsibility of stationing the firewatch patrol signature sheets.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), as an event or condition prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.7.13, requires that all fire rated assemblies be operable at all times or within 1 hour perform the required contingent actions.

Two entrance/egress paths are available for the 4 ft. 6 in. elevation of the ESF building. A review of the computer security key card reader history confirms that qualified firewatch personnel had entered the ESF sump and "A" Train RSS pipe tunnel areas located on the 4 ft. 6 in. elevation of the ESF building at a minimum of one firewatch patrol per hour for the duration of the event with the exception of a duration totalling 5 hour which was distributed throughout the event.

Fire suppression for the affected areas consists of the unit fire brigade. The fire brigade is required to respond when indication of a fire is received at the control room. Fire detection for the affected areas was fully operable during the event. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not jeopardized by this event.

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

IV. Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to establish an hourly firewatch patrol in the ESF building sump pipe tunnel area located on the north end of the 4 ft. 6 in. elevation of the ESF building. As action to prevent recurrence, the SS has been counseled in the importance of verifying communications and concerns to the applicable plant personnel. In addition, a procedural revision has been completed requiring non-licensed operator verification of proper firewatch patrol boundaries within one hour of declaring fire rated assemblies inoperable.

V Additional Information

LER 88-027, "Mislocated Firewatch Due to Personnel Error", discusses an event in which the Shift Supervisor misinterpreted the location of a failed fire detector. As a contributing factor, the applicable procedure was unclear as to the affected area. The corrective action/action to prevent recurrence of LER 88-027 would not have prevented the event discussed in this LER because it was directed towards avoiding confusion surrounding fire detector locations.

LER 87-029, "Failure to Post Firewatches Due to Operator Error", discusses events in which firewatches were not properly established. The corrective action/action to prevent recurrence included a CO_2 procedure revision requiring a check by non-licensed operators to ensure fire watches are in the correct location. The corrective action discussed in LER 87-029 was directed to the CO_2 procedure and did not have any time constraints. The corrective action discussed in this current LER has a broader scope and is more restrictive with the time requirements established. These actions should prevent recurrence of a similar event.

EIIS Codes

Systems
Engineered Safety Features Building - NF

Components
Fire Stops and Seals Penetration - PEN


REQUIRED LOCATION FOR ESF SUMP FIREWATCH PATROL
FIREWATCH INADVERTENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR ESF SUMP
REQUIRED LOCATION FOR "A" TRAIN RSS FIREWATCH PATROL
FIREWATCH INADVERTENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR "A" TRAIN RSS
ESF SUMP
"A" TRAIN RSS
"B" TRAIN RSS
3RMS-RE33
INSTR. XMTR. RACK
3RMS-RE34
3RSS*E1A
CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE
3RSS*E1C
3RSS*E1B
3RSS*E1D
3RHS*E1A
3RHS*P1A
RHS HT EXCHANGER 3RHS*E1B
RHS PUMP 3RHS*P1B

PLAN - EL. 4'-6"