

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

July 13, 1982

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station
Unit 2
Docket No. 50-370

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 370/82-03 (Final) concerning misidentification of non-ASME material as ASME Class 2. An interim report was submitted by my letter dated May 7, 1982.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

PBN/jfw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. P. R. Bemis
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

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Duke Power Company
McGuire Nuclear Station
Significant Deficiency

Report No: SD 370/82-03 (Final)

Report Date: July 13, 1982

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 2

Identification of Deficiency: Misidentification of non-ASME material as ASME Class 2.

Initial Report: On April 8, 1982, Mr. A. Ignatonis, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of a potential reportable deficiency by Mr. W. O. Henry, of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Description of Deficiency: The material received at the site was incorrectly identified as SA-516 GR 70 with impact tests, ASME Class 2. This material had not been impact tested nor was it certified to ASME Section III. This material may have been used as attachments to Class 2 and Class 3 piping and to containment.

The cause of this item was determined to be insufficient instruction given to the individual who reviewed the vendor documentation and subsequently misidentified the material.

Analysis of Safety Implications: Impact tests were performed on the three heats in question. Two of the three heats passed all Code requirements and would have resulted in no reduction of safety function. The remaining heat did not pass Code requirements for use as impact tested material. Had this heat been installed in a location requiring impact testing, it would have resulted in notch toughness values below that deemed necessary to fulfill the required safety function. Investigation has determined that this material was not installed in a location requiring impact tested material and, therefore, did not represent a safety hazard.

Corrective Action: The corrective action taken to prevent the recurrence of this situation is as follows:

1. The heat which did not pass the Code requirements was properly identified to prevent use in locations requiring impact tested material.
2. Uniform instructions have been developed for review and approval of vendor documentation.
3. One specific group has been assigned the responsibility of releasing plate for ASME applications by incorporation into the Released Piping Materials Status Log.