



July 14, 1982  
L-82-285

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-389  
Incorrect Valves Supplied and Installed

On May 19, 1982 Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) notified the Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55 (e), of a potential deficiency regarding the installation of AC solenoid rather than DC solenoid air control valves in the Sampling System. Attached please find our final resolution of this issue.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert E. Uhrig".

Robert E. Uhrig  
Vice President  
Advance Systems and Technology

REU/cab

Attachment

cc: Direct of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

A rectangular stamp with the words "OFFICIAL COPY" in a bold, sans-serif font. The stamp is slightly tilted and has a dark, ink-like appearance.

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## ATTACHMENT

### I. Summary

During review and inspection of the Sampling System it was determined that six pneumatically operated isolation valves had been installed with AC solenoid, rather than DC solenoid air control valves. If these Sample System valves failed to close upon demand during an accident, a small amount of radioactivity could potentially be released from the containment. Therefore, this issue is reportable according to the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The correct DC solenoid air control valves will be installed prior to core load.

### II. Description

Pneumatically operated valves V-5200, V-5201, V-5202, V-5203, V-5204 and V-5205 supplied by Hoke have been installed with AC air control valves instead of DC air control valves. However, Combustion Engineering Specifications 13172-PE-713 (R3) and 00000-PE-707 (R0) require 125 V DC solenoids. This discrepancy was documented in Nonconformance Report 3649E and Discrepant Field Condition 1460.

### III. Corrective Action

The air control valves will be replaced with 125V DC valves prior to core load.

### IV. Safety Implication

If the above Sample System valves did not close upon demand during an accident, there could exist the potential for the release of small amounts of radioactivity from the containment.

### V. Conclusion

This issue is reportable according to the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

This report is final and completes requirements for reporting to the NRC.