



Carolina Power & Light Company

July 13, 1982

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTN: Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324
LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62
DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAYS

Dear Mr. Vassallo:

Background

On June 3, 1977, NRC issued a Safety Evaluation and Staff Position Relative to Emergency Power Systems (EPS) for Operating Reactors. In response to the Staff position, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) developed and installed a plant modification to upgrade the EPS at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Unit Nos. 1 and 2 and by letter dated March 6, 1979, filed appropriate changes to Technical Specifications (TS). The amendments incorporating these changes were issued by NRC on June 11, 1980.

Discussion

On July 8, 1982, due to extensive research of the Staff position regarding EPS and the installed plant modification, it was determined the trip setpoint values listed in TS Table 3.3.3-2, item 5.a, were incorrect. This review determined incorrect relays were referenced in the plant modification and therefore, the wrong setpoint values were incorporated in TS. Carolina Power & Light Company promptly notified the NRC of this determination.

A TS change request will be submitted by July 23, 1982 to correct the aforementioned discrepancy. Carolina Power & Light Company commits to maintain the correct relays as if they were actually in TS until the subject TS can be amended. The correct relays for functions required by TS 3.3.3 have been calibrated within the past week.

A review of the relays that are currently in TS for Item 5.a and the concomitant TS setpoints has determined that the TS setpoints are incorrect as the tap setting is too high. Establishing and calibrating these relays at the incorrect TS value would increase the likelihood of a false-sensed undervoltage and a resultant challenge to safety systems. Because of the incorrect tap setting in TS, and the fact that these relays should not be in


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TS, CP&L does not intend to calibrate the relays currently addressed in TS Table 3.3.3-2, Item 5.a. by July 15, 1982 (refer to NRC letter dated July 1, 1982). Continued operation of BSEP Unit Nos. 1 and 2 without calibrating the relays will not affect the health or safety of the public as they are used solely on Balance-of-Plant switchgear and they are not addressed in any BSEP safety analysis.

If you have any questions regarding our actions or this letter, please contact my staff.

Yours very truly,



P. W. Howe
Vice President
Technical Services

MSG/cr (323C3T5)

cc: Messrs. D. O. Myers (NRC - BSEP)
J. P. O'Reilly (NRC Region II)
J. A. Van Vliet (NRC)