

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1))

Docket No. 50-322 O.L.
(Emergency Planning
Proceedings)

FIRST AMENDED
CONSOLIDATED EMERGENCY
PLANNING CONTENTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 10 CFR §2.714 and the Board's Order of April 20, 1982, Suffolk County, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition (SOC), and the North Shore Committee Against Nuclear and Thermal Pollution (NSC) hereby submit the following amended contentions with respect to those emergency planning issues that the Board has defined as presently subject to litigation in the Shoreham operating license proceedings.

At the Prehearing Conference of April 14, 1982, the Board restricted the issues regarding emergency planning "on which we can proceed to litigation" (Tr. 760). That area was defined as "the licensee's actions under its emergency plan whether those actions be onsite or offsite...." Tr. 760; see Tr. 746-747. The Board reiterated (Tr. at 799) that the focus of the

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contentions was to be on "LILCO's actions, where those actions are not dependent upon coordination with the County." Tr. 799. In its Order of April 20, 1980, the Board stated that the intervenors were to file contentions "based on LILCO's emergency plan" and offered several examples of issues falling within the bounds it had described. Order at 7. In light of the above guidance, the intervenors have confined their contentions to that area of emergency planning that the Board has scheduled for consideration, as defined above.

The Board further ordered that Suffolk County, SOC and NSC file consolidated contentions. Order at 8; Tr. at 802-803. This pleading represents substantial effort, and hours of discussion among counsel for the intervening parties, to comply with that request. Drafts of the contentions were sent to counsel for the NRC and LILCO on June 17 and 18, 1982, followed by a two-hour conference call among the parties on June 21, 1982 during which they discussed the admissibility of the contentions. See Order at 8. Some of the revisions suggested at that time by counsel for the NRC and LILCO were incorporated into the emergency planning contentions filed on June 22, 1982. Since that date, and in particular in a meeting held on June 30, 1982, the parties have continued their discussion of the contentions in order to further particularize and narrow the focus of the issues. This amended pleading includes a number

of the suggestions offered by counsel for the NRC and LILCO at that meeting.

It bears noting that on June 11, 1982, Suffolk County, SOC, the NRC staff, and LILCO entered into a "Resolution of SC Contention 28(a)(iii)/SOC Contention 7A(3) and SC Contention 27(c)/SOC Contention 3(c)." As stated in that agreement, it was understood that the resolution of the iodine monitoring issue was "without prejudice to the right of SC or SOC to submit a contention in the emergency planning proceeding which would contest the adequacy of iodine monitoring at Shoreham...[A]ny such contention will be submitted by June 22, 1982, or within 14 days after the information to be delivered pursuant [to the resolution] has been received by the County, whichever is later." Since the information on iodine monitoring has not yet been received from LILCO, Suffolk County and SOC reserve the right to submit an iodine monitoring contention at a later date.

Likewise, the parties reserve the right to submit a contention concerning the Technical Support Center when that facility is completed.

CONTENTIONS

EPl: OVERALL LILCO PLAN INADEQUACY (SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

The Board should rule that LILCO's plan is inadequate under 10 CFR §50.47, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654 criteria because the state of preparedness under that plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. LILCO has not adequately identified and evaluated local conditions in Long Island that could influence the public notification system, public education program, accident assessment and monitoring systems, protective action measures, and evacuation time estimates referenced in the LILCO plan and used in preparation of that plan. The failure of LILCO to tailor these systems, programs, measures, and estimates to local conditions precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO plan is workable.

The local conditions which LILCO has neither identified nor evaluated are the following:

- (1) local demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population likely to be affected by a radiological emergency;

- (2) the social and behavioral characteristics of the population likely to be affected by a radiological emergency;
- (3) local topographical and geographical characteristics;
- (4) emergency evacuation alternatives, routes, and transportation facilities; and
- (5) the types of materials of which local houses and buildings are constructed and the extent to which these materials would affect the health effects of a radiological release in the event that sheltering is the recommended protective action.

Suffolk County contends that LILCO must, in developing the systems, programs, measures, and estimates identified above, determine the extent to which such local conditions affect LILCO's own responsibilities (irrespective of the size of the EPZ and even assuming for present purposes an EPZ of about 10 miles), and must account for such effects in its plan.

EP2: PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

LILCO intends that individuals situated within a 10-mile radius of the plant will be alerted to a radiological emergency through 89 sirens and approximately 150 tone alert receivers (Plan at 6-14 through 6-16; Wyle Laboratories Report WR 82-10

at 4-3). LILCO's system, known as the "Prompt Notification System," is inadequate to effectively notify the population which may be affected by a radiological emergency and thus fails to meet the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(5) and (6), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.E and F for the following reasons:

- A. LILCO has failed to demonstrate that the siren coverage will not be constricted significantly during weather conditions such as rain, snow, fog, high winds and thunderstorms which may adversely affect the ability to hear the siren.
- B. LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that in the event of a loss of power to all or part of the system, it could provide backup power in time to offer timely warning to the population.
- C. The LILCO plan, as augmented by the Wyle Report, calls for signs to be placed on beaches and other recreational areas to provide information on actions to be taken in case of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham facility. LILCO has failed to provide reasonable assurance that notification through the use of signs will be effective in that:
 - (1) LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that the signs will be read by transients on a beach or in a park;

- (2) LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that the signs will contain information which is accurate and sufficiently descriptive to convey necessary information to the reader;
 - (3) LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that transients in the vicinity will be able to perceive a connection between the sirens LILCO contemplates using and any information contained in the signs;
 - (4) LILCO has failed to specify intervals between signs which would be appropriate under emergency conditions.
 - (5) LILCO's plan does not provide for maintenance and protection of the signs.
- D. LILCO's prompt notification system does not provide complete siren coverage of all of the population within the EPZ as shown by the gaps evident on the map appended to the Wyle Report. LILCO has not adequately provided for notification of individuals who may be within the areas not covered by sirens.
- E. For notification of large facilities within a 10-mile zone around the Shoreham Plant (including 50 schools, 15 nursery schools, 14 nursing homes, 36 recreational areas, and 11 major employers), LILCO intends to

alert a central location within each such facility with a tone alert radio. This places the responsibility for notifying the remaining inhabitants of each large facility upon the institution or organization in question. LILCO's plan is inadequate in that:

- (1) It has failed to demonstrate that each such facility has sufficient in-house paging or alerting capabilities to carry out the notification task. Nor has it demonstrated that each facility has developed appropriate messages and instructions to disseminate to its personnel, and that each facility intends to hold drills to test the adequacy of its internal notification system.
- (2) It has failed to demonstrate that each such organization or facility has agreed to bear notification responsibilities and that such responsibilities will be effectively implemented.

F. There is no indication within the LILCO plan that LILCO has in place an effective program to properly verify the operability of the tone alert system.

- G. LILCO has failed to demonstrate that 10-mile siren coverage is the proper coverage for the Shoreham facility. The large population groups located just outside a 10-mile radius zone, and the effects resulting from movement of persons from outside a 10-mile radius zone to within that zone (thus potentially hindering the emergency response), require that placement and coverage include such population groups. This is also necessary to assure that such population groups have accurate information on the state of emergency conditions so as to guide their own behavior and to control the spread of rumors.
- H. The system does not provide for notification of those who are deaf or hard of hearing.

EP3: MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

- A. Suffolk County contends that LILCO, by designating Central Suffolk Hospital as the primary medical facility to treat contaminated individuals, and further by designating University Hospital in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for backup medical treatment, has failed to provide adequate medical services for contaminated individuals as required by 10 CFR §50.47(b)(12), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Items IV.E.5 through 7, and NUREG 0654, Items K and L for the following reasons:

- (1) Central Suffolk Hospital may itself become subject to radiological exposure and/or evacuation given its location approximately nine miles from the Shoreham site (Plan at 6-21).
- (2) University Hospital is too distant to provide timely treatment of contaminated individuals.
- (3) LILCO has not demonstrated that Central Suffolk Hospital has the capacity to treat and/or decontaminate the many contaminated and injured persons who may require treatment in the event of a radiological emergency.

B. Furthermore, LILCO has failed to adequately demonstrate that ground transportation (Plan at 6-21A) is adequate for conveyance of contaminated individuals to Central Suffolk Hospital under the congested traffic or radiological conditions that might exist during a radiological emergency. Thus, LILCO has failed to satisfy 10 CFR §50.47(b)(12), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.E.6, and NUREG 0654, Item II.L.4.

C. The LILCO plan does not contain up-to-date agreements with Central Suffolk Hospital, University Hospital or the Wading River Fire District for emergency medical services to be provided by those facilities. Moreover, the agreements in the plan with Central

Suffolk Hospital and the Wading River Fire Department lack specific information to determine whether those organizations can provide necessary medical services in the event of a radiological emergency. Thus, LILCO has failed to satisfy 10 CFR §§50.47 (b)(3) and (12), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.C.4 and L.4.

EP4: FEDERAL RESOURCES
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

The LILCO plan fails to provide for incorporation of Federal response capabilities into the plan. The plan makes no mention of specific Federal resources expected to arrive at the facility and their estimated time of arrival, nor does it identify specific utility and local resources available to support the Federal response. Thus, Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47 (b)(1),(2) and (3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.A.7, and NUREG 0654, Items A.2 and 3, and C.1.

EP5: PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not met the requirements of 10 CFR §50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E or NUREG 0654, Item II.J with respect to development and implementation of a range of protective actions for emergency workers and the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and with respect to development of guidelines for the choices of such actions for the following reasons:

- A. The LILCO plan and procedures do not adequately discuss the bases for the choice of recommended protective actions (i.e., the choice between various ranges of evacuation vs. sheltering vs. other options) for the plume exposure pathway EPZ during emergency conditions. In addition, LILCO has not assessed the relative benefits of various protective actions under the particular conditions existing in the Shoreham vicinity. Thus, LILCO does not have sufficient knowledge or information to provide reliable, accurate protective action recommendations.
- B. The LILCO plan does not provide an adequate evacuation time estimate study to assist it in recommending protective actions to State and local agencies. While there are evacuation time estimates contained

in the implementing procedure entitled, "Protective Action Recommendations," they are faulty in the following respects:

- (1) The LILCO evacuation time estimates do not take into consideration the particular local conditions surrounding the Shoreham facility. Rather, the evacuation time estimates are based upon an arbitrary 10-mile area around the Shoreham site.
- (2) There is no estimate for evacuation of the entire EPZ.
- (3) The estimates fail to account for voluntary evacuation or other actions (such as persons entering the EPZ to assist family members) by people in adjacent zones within the EPZ, or in areas outside the EPZ, and the effects of such actions on the evacuation times and the choice of recommended protective actions.
- (4) The estimates are based on an unrealistic assumption that only twenty minutes will be required for mobilization of the affected population.
- (5) The zonal configuration for which each estimate is made is approximately a 45 degree sector -

well below the suggested subarea aggregations detailed in NUREG 0654, Appendix 4. Therefore, the time required to evacuate the larger zones detailed in NUREG 0654 may be underestimated.

- C. The LILCO plan does not address protective action recommendations for persons with particularized needs or for whom the full range of protective actions may not be available such as persons utilizing beaches (sheltering not possible), bedridden persons, persons on boats, the handicapped, those in hospitals or other health care institutions, those in penal institutions, the elderly or those without transportation of their own.
- D. LILCO's decision to suggest (Plan at 4-2) that sheltering is the immediate protective action to be taken at the general emergency action level until the feasibility of evacuation prior to a "significant" radiological release can be evaluated is inadequate because:
- (1) It fails to provide for the population for which sheltering is not available (such as those individuals on beaches or in transit).
 - (2) It is not based upon an analysis of the relative benefits and disadvantages of sheltering versus

evacuation or other protective actions, nor has LILCO specifically analyzed the degree of sheltering offered by residential structures in the affected areas of Long Island.

- (3) It does not define the term "significant," which, without definition, cannot be objectively judged as a standard or evaluated to determine whether it is a workable guideline. Moreover, such a subjective standard would provide no practical guidance to decisionmakers in an emergency.
- (4) There is no analysis of the affected population centers and principal places of employment in order to determine whether immediate protective actions should be selective and different for various segments of the affected public.

EP6: OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO has failed to provide reasonable assurance that onsite assistance from offsite agencies will be forthcoming in the event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham site. LILCO has therefore not met the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(1),(2),(3),(8),(12) and (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654 for the following reasons:

- A. It does not appear that LILCO has addressed or analyzed the possibility that offsite personnel expected to report to the Shoreham site for emergency duty, many of whom are volunteers, would fail to report (or report in a timely manner) because of conflicting family (or other) duties that would arise in the event of a radiological emergency.
- B. LILCO has not adequately demonstrated the possible effects of traffic congestion during evacuation of the population upon the ability of offsite personnel to respond promptly to the Shoreham site.
- C. The LILCO plan does not contain up-to-date contracts with local fire and ambulance organizations or other offsite organizations concerning the services those organizations will provide in the event of a radiological emergency.

EP7: TRAINING
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO has failed to meet the training requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(11) and (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.K and O for all personnel who may be called upon to assist in an emergency for the following reasons:

- A. LILCO has not provided adequate assurance that fire, ambulance, and other such personnel from offsite agencies expected to respond for emergency duty in the vicinity of the Shoreham plant have received adequate radiological emergency response training. Without such training, the County contends that an adequate response as required by Section 50.47 cannot be assumed.
- B. LILCO in Chapter 8 of the Plan, provides inadequate information regarding the training of its own personnel. Accordingly, there is no assurance that their personnel will have adequate training to take the steps necessary in a radiological emergency.

EP8: PUBLIC EDUCATION
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that, for the following reasons, LILCO has not demonstrated that its public education program will adequately inform the population potentially affected by a radiological emergency of the initial and subsequent actions to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, and such other information as required by 10 CFR §50.47(b)(5),(6) and (7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.E,F and G.

- A. The plan at 8-17 through 8-20 does not satisfactorily describe the form and content of materials to be distributed to residents or posted for transients, nor does it clearly define the frequency with which various forms of information will be disseminated to the public.
- B. There is no indication that LILCO has prepared its public education program with recognition of the particular social and psychological profile of Suffolk County's residents, or that it has taken into account the probable response of particular groups, such as the economically disadvantaged, to its education program. Absent an evaluation of the social and psychological profile of County residents, and integration of the evaluation into the LILCO public education program, there can be no basis to find that the LILCO education program satisfies regulatory requirements.

EP9: ONSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATION
AND AUGMENTATION
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not satisfactorily delineated the responsibilities of LILCO response personnel, nor has it demonstrated adequately that it will be able to augment its emergency response staff in a timely manner. Thus,

LILCO's emergency response plan is not in compliance with 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(1)(2)(3) and (8), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.A,B,C and H for the following reasons:

- A. The LILCO plan at 5-4 through 5-8 does not clearly define and distinguish between the functions of the Emergency Director and the Response Manager;
- B. Table 5-1 does not clearly demonstrate LILCO's ability to augment its staff within 30 minutes of declaration of an emergency and is not in compliance with Table B-1 of NUREG 0654.
- C. LILCO has not evaluated the effects upon its emergency response efforts of potential family (or other) role conflicts that may inhibit or even prevent LILCO personnel from responding to a radiological emergency.
- D. LILCO has not evaluated the effects that extreme traffic conditions engendered by an evacuation, either ordered or voluntary, would have upon its ability to augment its emergency response staff.

EP10: PUBLIC INFORMATION
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not made clear in its plan that Suffolk County officials should take a major role in determining the form and substance of public statements concerning actions occurring and to be taken during a radiological emergency, which role is not apparent from the face of the LILCO plan at 5-25 through 5-26. Therefore, LILCO is not in compliance with 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(1),(3),(5) and (7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.A,C,E and G.

EP11: COMMUNICATIONS
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

LILCO intends to maintain communications with hospitals, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Department of Energy during a radiological emergency using only commercial telephone lines (Plan at 7-79) which may become overloaded under emergency conditions. Thus, Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not provided for adequate communications with those facilities as required by 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(1),(2),(3),(5) and (6), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.A,B,C,E and F.

EP12: EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO's plan and procedures for operation of its Emergency Response Facilities are not in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR §50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Item II.H in that:

- A. The LILCO plan at 7-3A states that the EOF shall achieve operational readiness within two hours of declaration of an emergency. Such an activation time violates the one hour requirement of NUREG 0696.
- B. There is, as yet, no provision for obtaining at the EOF, or at any other LILCO emergency response facility, information relating to seismic phenomena (Plan at 7-12B).
- C. LILCO proposes to activate its EOF only upon declaration of a Site Area or General Emergency (Plan at 7-3A). The EOF should be activated at an earlier time in an accident to ensure operational readiness in the event that an accident escalates to a more severe classification level.

EP13: NOTIFICATION OF RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS
AND EMERGENCY PERSONNEL
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not developed notification procedures for offsite response organizations and

onsite personnel (both those onsite at the time of an emergency and those called to report for duty after an emergency has commenced) in a manner consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme set forth in NUREG 0654, Appendix 1. Thus, LILCO has not ensured that sufficient trained personnel will be available when required. Furthermore, the LILCO plan does not provide the contents of initial and followup messages to offsite authorities. Therefore, LILCO does not meet the notification requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(1),(2),(3),(4) and (5), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.A,B,C,D and E.

EP14: PUBLIC MESSAGES
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

LILCO's plan does not include written messages intended for dissemination to the public through various media in the event of a radiological emergency, thus failing to meet the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(5),(6) and (7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Item IV.D, and NUREG 0654, Items II.E,F and G.

EP15: OFFSITE PLANNING COORDINATION
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

LILCO has failed to demonstrate radiological emergency planning and coordination with the State of Connecticut as required by 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(1) and (3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.A and C.

EP16: RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

LILCO has failed to demonstrate that it has established the means for controlling radiological exposures to emergency workers (both LILCO personnel and those from offsite agencies). Thus, it has not met the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(11) and (15), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.K and O in that:

- A. The plan inadequately describes provisions for monitoring individuals evacuated from the site.
- B. The plan does not describe action levels for determining the need for decontamination of emergency response personnel.
- C. The plan does not adequately delineate guidelines for emergency workers to follow to ensure that exposures received by such workers are not excessive.

EP17: EXERCISES
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

In discussing annual exercises (Plan 8-13), LILCO states that "the scenario will be rotated each year to ensure all major elements of the plan are tested over a five-year period." That statement is inconsistent with the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, which specifies that each annual exercise shall test as much of the integrated plans "as is reasonably achievable...." LILCO's five-year program is short of this requirement. Thus, Suffolk County contends that LILCO has not met the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG 0654, Item II.N.

EP18: EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

LILCO has failed to establish an adequate Emergency Action Level (EAL) system as required by 10 CFR §50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Items II.D.1 and 2 for the following reasons:

- A. LILCO has not established EALs for each initiating condition specified in Appendix 1 to NUREG 0654.
- B. The initiating conditions do not include all of the postulated accidents in the FSAR.
- C. Certain EALs are incomplete or under development as noted at pp. 4-4 and 4-8.

EP19: ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING
(SC, joined by NSC and SOC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO's plan is inadequate with respect to its ability to assess and mitigate accidents and monitor radiological releases from the Shoreham facility in the event of a radiological emergency. Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(2), (4), (8), (9) and (10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG 0654, Items II.B,D,H,I and J in the following respects:

- A. LILCO's commitment to only three field monitoring teams is inadequate given the large area and population that will need to be covered in the event of an accident. Furthermore, LILCO's failure to require deployment of monitoring teams prior to the site emergency stage, and the time necessary (60 minutes) for such deployment, are inadequate for timely monitoring of potential radiological releases.
- B. LILCO does not intend to use real time monitors at fixed locations that can be remotely interrogated.
- C. LILCO does not identify specific instruments to be used for classification of emergencies (NUREG 0654 II.D.1).
- D. LILCO does not identify in sufficient detail the type and capability of specific process and radiological

instruments and monitoring systems required for initiating emergency measures and conducting assessments (NUREG 0654 II.H.5.b and c).

- E. The plan does not contain identification of fire and combustion product detection equipment (NUREG 0654 II.H.5.d).
- F. The plan does not provide for a mobile radiological laboratory facility to cover the event when highways leading to the fixed laboratory sites may be obstructed (NUREG 0654, II.H.6.c).

EP20: FAILURE OF SHOREHAM/LILCO'S EMERGENCY PLANS
TO COMPLY WITH NRC/FEMA REGULATIONS
(NSC, joined by SOC. SC will participate as an interested County pursuant to 10 CFR §2.715)

NSC1 (EP) [EP20(a)]: Notification procedures established by LILCO to communicate with State and local response organizations do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.II.C, G, H and IV.E.9.

Bases:

(1) Both the dedicated and commercial telephone lines and the low-powered UHF radio station upon which Shoreham's notification/communications network rely are inadequate.

(2) Given the significant probability that the telephone system will break down, suffer a power overload or be sabotaged by hostile forces, and the absence of a backup power source,

there is a strong likelihood of inadequate and untimely notification to State and local response organizations.

(3) LILCO's plan does not take into account the history of power outages in Long Island which have rendered telephone systems inoperable for extensive periods of time.

(4) The placement of telephone lines overhead exposes the telephone communications system to sabotage and extreme weather conditions.

(5) The breakdown of the telephone system in the event of an emergency shutdown at the plant or an overall system overload would prevent LILCO from assigning and specifying primary responsibilities for emergency response between the applicant and State and local response organizations.

(6) Measures to communicate with key plant personnel who may not be in the plant or at home when an emergency occurs have not been adequately addressed.

(7) Insufficient personnel are connected to the "hotline" to satisfy the requirements of the regulations.

(8) LILCO's plan does not address the stress and strain to which the personnel assigned to response and notification may be subjected when confronted with a previously unexperienced radiological emergency.

(9) LILCO has assigned too few Emergency Operations Facility personnel to transmit the key information to offsite

emergency support and response organizations from an onsite location.

(10) The communication/notification system is inadequate to arrange for, request, and effectively use assistance resources.

(11) The communication/notification system does not assure State and local response organizations that LILCO will be able to provide them with the information which they require to determine minimum initial offsite response measures.

(12) The Electrical Emergency Restoration Procedure does not meet the criteria for an adequate backup power source.

(13) The plan presents insufficient data about the coverage and load capacities of the low-powered UHF base radio station to assess its capabilities if a breakdown in the primary telephone systems should occur.

NSC2 (EP) [EP20(b)]: Communications between LILCO and State and local response organizations do not meet the federal standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.II.G and Appendix E.IV.D.1, D.3, and Appendix E.IV.E.9.

Bases:

The interaction between the notification contentions, (NSC 1 (EP)), and this contention is obvious. The following particularizations of this contention are added and do not overlap contention NSC 1(EP).

(1) Communications with the outside governmental agencies, the Media and the public are inadequately staffed, briefed and technically equipped to ensure a coordinated dissemination of vital information to these offsite sources of support and response implementation.

(2) The plan presents insufficient data to determine if the two-way UHF radio between the control room of the plant and the ENS will not malfunction, suffer an overload or interference.

(3) The plan presents insufficient data to determine if LILCO's "uninterruptible power source" to back up their party line system (Rev. B, Shoreham Annex, §5.7.7), is both adequate and capable of being implemented.

(4) Assignment of the Health Physics Engineer to sole responsibility for ensuring the availability of the communication equipment during emergency conditions is both imprudent and unrealistic.

(5) The plan gives an inordinate amount of responsibility to the Emergency Director, but has not included the Emergency Director's private home in the network of those accessible to the Private Automatic Exchange.

(6) The plan does not consider that the Emergency Director may not be able to perform the non-delegable tasks assigned to him/her.

(7) The plan gives inadequate consideration to the possibility that the Emergency Director or the Response Manager may make communication decisions or allocate the limited communications resources in a manner in conflict with the county or State's decisions in these areas.

NSC3 (EP) [EP20(c)]: Arrangements for assistance resources needed onsite, particularly medical and emergency transportation assistance, do not meet 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(8), (b)(10), (b)(11), and (b)(12), as mandated by the NRC.

Bases:

(1) There is no assurance that medical personnel will be notified, or if notified, will be available, in sufficient time to provide medical assistance.

(2) The plan does not assure adequate transportation and medical assistance to transport contaminated and/or injured persons from an irradiated area for medical treatment.

(3) There is no contingency plan to deal with unpreparedness, overcrowding, refusal to contaminate other patients and workers by the emergency facilities.

(4) LILCO's plans do not adequately correlate medical assistance with the different types of emergency classifications.

(5) The plan does not provide reasonably specific indicia of the contents of the applicant's messages to the emergency

assistance workers and agencies in their relationship to the different classifications of an emergency.

(6) The provisions for backup medical assistance with the requisite training, facilities and preparation to respond to an emergency are inadequate.

(7) The letters of agreement with the medical and other facilities are not current and, additionally, do not specify the functions each will perform.

EP21: RECOVERY AND REENTRY

(SOC, joined by SC and NSC)

The applicant has failed to develop adequate procedures pursuant to 10 CFR §50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654 criteria that address plant recovery and the determination of population doses, including procedures that describe when, how, under what conditions, and at what risk to the public, recovery will take place.

EP22: Interim Safety Parameter Display
System (SPDS)

(SC, joined by SOC and NSC)

Suffolk County contends that the interim SPDS that LILCO proposes to utilize until the installation of a permanent SPDS is deficient because it does not meet minimum requirements for such a system. Specifically, the interim SPDS does not:

- A. provide all required parameters;
- B. provide for data verification;
- C. provide trending capability;
- D. provide information to the TSC and EOF;
- E. provide the function of aiding the operator in the interpretation of transients and accidents, nor does it provide this function during and following all events expected to occur during the life of the plant, including earthquakes;
- F. meet human factor requirements;

Thus, the interim SPDS does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(4), (8), and (9), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 13, and NUREGs 0696, 0737 and 0654.

EP23: Permanent Safety Parameter
Display System
(SC, joined by SCC and NSC)

LILCO has not demonstrated that its proposed "permanent" SPDS will meet the requirements of NUREG 0696. Thus, the permanent SPDS does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47 (b)(4), (8), and (9), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 13, and NUREGs 0696, 0737 and 0654.

EP24: Emergency Operating Procedures
(SC, joined by SOC and NSC)

Suffolk County contends that LILCO's emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs) are not complete and approved as required by 10 CFR §50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG 0654, Item II.P.7.

EP25: Accident Assessment Equipment
(SC, joined by SOC and NSC)

Suffolk County contends that neither the LILCO plan, nor its EPIPs include information necessary to identify the classification or qualification of equipment to be used in assessing an accident condition or mitigating the results of an accident. Thus, LILCO has not met the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(8) and (9), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG 0654, Items II.I and P.

EP26: Human Factors
(SC, joined by SOC and NSC)


LILCO's radiological emergency response plan and EPIPs have not been demonstrated to incorporate necessary human factors principles and analyses. Thus, Suffolk County contends that LILCO has failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR §50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG 0654, Items H and I.

EP27: PRA/Consequence Analysis
(SC, joined by SOC and NSC)

LILCO has not completed, nor has the NRC reviewed, a PRA/consequence analysis to provide the basis for the accident assessment and dose assessment models. Thus, Suffolk County contends that there is no assurance that LILCO has met the requirements of 10 CFR §§50.47(b)(9) and (10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and the planning criteria of NUREG 0654.


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Dated: July 6, 1982

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of)
)
)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY)
)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,)
Unit 1))
)

) Docket No. 50-322 (O.L.)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the First Amended Consolidated Emergency Planning Contentions were sent on July 6, 1982, by first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

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