

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

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June 17, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 SPECIAL REPORT 82-2,
REVISION 1

The enclosed special report is a supplement to my letter to you dated
April 30, 1982 concerning penetration fire barrier being non-functional
for a period in excess of seven days. This report is submitted in
accordance with Sequoyah unit 1 Technical Specifications 3.7.12 and
6.9.2.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Sequoyah

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

SPECIAL REPORT 82-2, REVISION 1

UNIT 1

Event Description

Electrical penetration 721C0420Q000 in the control building cable spreading room was breached for a period greater than seven (7) days.

Four pipe penetrations between the turbine building and auxiliary building were breached for a period greater than seven (7) days.

Probable Cause

The cable penetration was breached on 03/26/82 and during cable pulling on 03/29/82 and 03/30/82, the cables became contaminated. Health Physics surveys could not locate the source and required HP personnel be present when cables were being pulled. Due to these unexpected delays, the cable pulling was not complete until 04/02/82 (7th day). Personnel began sealing the penetration immediately, but the resealing was not complete until 04/05/82.

The pipe penetrations were breached on 04/13/82 to install piping for an essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system piping modification. Failure to seal the penetrations within the seven (7) day requirement has been attributed to the cognizant engineer being unaware of the seriousness of sealing the penetrations within time requirements and installation of the forms for sealing the penetrations being delayed due to the alignment of the piping in the penetration. The penetrations were resealed on 04/23/82.

In both cases the proper procedures for breaching fire barrier penetrations were followed (including verification of fire detector operability and establishment of an hourly fire watch as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12).

Corrective Actions

Foremen, general foremen, and engineers were instructed in the importance of meeting the seven (7) day breaching requirement. Communication between shifts was also stressed to ensure maximum use of allotted time while penetrations are breached so that time will be available for unseen problems.