



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

June 10, 1982

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417
File: 0260/0272/L860.0
PMP Site Drainage
AECM-82/263

Your staff and members of NRC Inspection and Enforcement, Region 2, were advised that changes made in the power block area in the final stages of construction of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station have adversely affected the runoff of water during the site's postulated Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) event. This concern was identified in a final review of site drainage acceptability and was reported to NRC I&E in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) on May 10, 1982 as potentially reportable deficiency (PRD) Serial 82/27. These final changes in site topography result in potential floodwaters during the PMP event as high as Elevation 133' 5". Previously the local PMP event was not expected to exceed Elevation 133', the entrance elevation to some safety related buildings.

The latest results of MP&L's evaluation on this issue were presented to your Mr. G. Staley (HGEB) on June 3, 1982, and Mr. J. Wermiel (ASB) on June 4, 1982. As a result, it is MP&L's understanding that the approach for both short term and long term solutions were acceptable, as described below.

An analysis, currently underway, is to be completed and reported to you prior to exceeding 5% power which evaluates the impact of inleakage into safety related structures during this event. This analysis consists of the following major steps.

1. Estimation of leakage past all doors at entrances to safety related buildings.
2. Evaluation of flow paths internal to subject buildings; evaluation of impact on any safety related equipment.

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
3. Evaluation of adequacy of floor drains to handle inleakage; evaluation of adequacy of radwaste system to accommodate water from drain system, where applicable.
4. Final conclusions, based on above considerations of need for barriers to further restrict inleakage.

If the above analysis concludes that barriers are necessary to prevent or minimize inleakage into safety related buildings, permanent modifications will be proposed for implementation prior to startup from the first regularly scheduled refueling outage. Under consideration at this time is the modification or replacement of the subject doors to minimize inleakage. The final design details will be provided for your review prior to implementation of the design change.

In the interim period, MP&L proposes that temporary barriers provide adequate protection, i.e., the use of sandbags. An appropriate supply of sandbags will be available at each door should water levels reach the PMP predicted levels. Temporary measures are believed adequate due to conservatism employed in the analysis to arrive at the PMP flood levels and due to the marginal amount of water at the subject doors (5" maximum).

As noted above the results of an analysis will be provided prior to exceeding 5% power. If further information is required, please advise.

Yours truly,



L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

JGC/JDR:lm

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. G. B. Taylor
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
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