



# MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

*Helping Build Mississippi*

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JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.  
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:



SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417  
File 0262/0472/L-860.0/L-401.0  
Complete Response Concerning IE  
Bulletin 80-25  
Ref: AECM-81/114 & AECM-81/182  
AECM-81/451

Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) completed their review of IE Bulletin 80-25, "Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves (SRVs) at BWRs" for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and transmitted their response in AECM-81/182.

In AECM-81/182, dated June 23, 1981, we stated "MP&L does not use Loctite in the internal assembly of the solenoid actuators [of Safety/Relief Valves]".

On March 3 and 4, 1981, Dikkers safety/relief valves had passed (water discharge) operability tests at Wyle for the BWR Owner's Group [generic] Test Program.

On July 21, 1981 MP&L received information of defective safety-relief valves. During testing (per CGNS FSAR Question QA 211.49) of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves by Wyle Laboratories, six (6) of the twenty (20) tested did not meet the Emergency Operability Acceptance Criteria; they did not open within the required time period when power was applied to the solenoid valves.

Investigation of the six defective SRV's indicated that Loctite 640 had caused the ball in a ball check valve to seize in its seated position in the solenoid control assembly, a subassembly of the actuator. Through inspection it was determined that the Loctite 640 which adhered the ball to the seat had oozed out from between the ball seat and the nozzle. It had been placed on the nozzle which is force fitted into the front cover and sealed with Loctite in the Seitz shop. The Loctite had not hardened when tests were performed at the manufacturers shop several months earlier yet had hardened by the time Wyle's tests were conducted.

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
The Dikkers instruction manual sent with the SRV's was written for field use and did not address assembly or disassembly of parts that cannot be taken apart in the field. The only reference to Loctite in the Dikkers SRV instruction manual directs its use on the threads of six (6) screws used for coupling external parts of the actuator. Because of the limited mention of Loctite in the manual, MP&L had determined Loctite not to be a potential problem in the internal portions of the solenoid actuator assemblies.

To ensure appropriate follow-up and corrective actions the defective valves are being tracked by PRD-81/33. A cleaning procedure was developed for refurbishment. After refurbishment, the assemblies were tested according to the approved production test procedure for the solenoid control assembly. When the assemblies were reinstalled on the SRV's, the SRV's were tested for proper operation and found to be acceptable. As the nozzles are only installed once and not removed or reinstalled in the field, all 20 Unit 1 SRV's have been appropriately refurbished, retrofitted and tested. Spare solenoid control assemblies are undergoing the retrofit.

Per our correspondence with General Electric, other plants using Dikker's SRV's have been notified of the problem and the SRV's will be refurbished per the established procedure. As this item is being tracked by PRD-81/33 (for GGNS) no further action on IE Bulletin 80-25 is anticipated.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, please advise.

Yours truly,



JPM:ph

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley  
Mr. R. B. McGehee  
Mr. T. B. Conner  
Mr. G. B. Taylor

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director  
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