

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

February 10, 1982

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 81-01 - RII:JPO 50-259,  
-260, -296 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

In our response to the subject bulletin dated March 13, 1981 as confirmed by R. C. Lewis' letter to H. G. Parris dated June 12, 1981, TVA committed to inspect certain snubbers. Enclosed are the results of these inspections which were performed on unit 3. An additional report will be submitted for unit 2 after inspections are performed during that unit's refueling outage. Results of the unit 1 inspections were provided by my letter to you dated July 23, 1981. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE  
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO OIE BULLETIN 81-01  
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3  
(50-296)

All International Nuclearsafeguards Corporation (INC) mechanical snubbers installed in unit 3 are being replaced with Pacific Scientific Corporation (PSC) mechanical snubbers. This modification will be completed before returning the unit to service. After removal, each of the INC snubbers was visually inspected and tested for operability in accordance with plant instructions. Eight of the snubbers failed to meet the drag force requirement in compression. Of those snubbers, six were within 5 pounds, one was within 10 pounds, and one was within 20 pounds of the established value. It was determined analytically, based on the installed geometry of the snubbers, that the piping was not overstressed when subjected to these drag forces.

This action and report completes the requirements for item 2 of the bulletin and applicable portions of item 4 for reporting the results on unit 3.

All other mechanical snubbers installed in safety-related systems in unit 3 are PSC Model PSA-10. Thirty-eight PSC snubbers were visually inspected and functionally tested during the outage according to plant instructions. Those PSC snubbers not inspected this outage were inspected the previous outage in December 1980.

Three PSA-10 snubbers were replaced because of failure to meet the breakaway and drag force requirements of the functional test. An examination of the affected piping was performed at each of the snubber locations. The examination also included visual inspection of the piping and supports on either side of the failed snubbers and testing of other snubbers in the vicinity of the failed snubbers. No evidence of physical damage or overstressing was observed. Each of the snubbers removed from the system was disassembled in the presence of a PSC representative. Each of the snubbers moved through their stroke without exceeding the drag force acceptance criteria after the PSC representative removed the bottom dust cover and rotated the inertia mass. Two of the snubbers showed no evidence of damage or excessive internal wear. It was concluded that although the drag force had increased significantly, no damage to the piping or the two snubbers resulted and the snubbers remained capable of performing their designed function.

Disassembly of the third snubber, mark number 7iL2, revealed moderate wear on the capstan spring braking surface and thrust bearing. A small chip from the thrust bearing race at the connection to the ball screw shaft indicated the snubber had been overloaded.

This action and report completes the requirements for item 3 of the bulletin and the applicable portion of item 4 for reporting the results on unit 3.