

# Transamerica Delaval



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March 19, 1982

Director, Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555



Dear Sir:

In accordance with Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21, Transamerica Delaval, Inc., hereby notifies the Commission of a potential defect in a component of a DSRV of DSR Standby Diesel Generator. There exists a potential problem with the sensing line between the starting air storage tank and the starting air compressor.

Air tanks are seismic category I. The starting air compressor is not seismically supported. The sensing line is not supplied by Transamerica Delaval. On some jobs, Transamerica Delaval furnished a manual isolation valve for the sensing line. When the isolation valve was furnished by Transamerica Delaval, it was seismically qualified. On the jobs where the isolation valve was not supplied by Transamerica Delaval, it is not known if the valve is seismically qualified, or if a valve was installed.

During a seismic event, the sensing line could fail causing the starting air pressure to bleed down to a point where the engines would not start if required.

During normal conditions, the starting air pressure cycles between 215 and 250 psig. There is a low pressure alarm at 210 psig. If the operator were not present to shut the manual valve, the pressure could fall to 150 psig where the engine would not start automatically. We have calculated this time to be between 6 minutes and 15 minutes depending on the type of valve used. We have been advised by one of our customers that a general guideline in excess of 30 minutes should be used for operator action.

The corrective action that Transamerica Delaval recommends is installing a 1/8" restricting orifice between the manual isolation valve and the starting air tank. A 1/8" orifice would increase the time to reach 150 psig to 53 minutes. The 1/8" size is large enough to permit reasonable rapid transmission of pressure change both ways. The manual isolation valve must be seismically qualified.



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Transamerica Delaval became aware of this potential problem February 2, 1982. We received a letter from Bechtel Corporation, Gaithersburgh, MD, in which this situation was discussed. At the time, Transamerica Delaval reviewed the potential problem and decided it was not a reportable incident due to the redundant systems. We had a telephone conversation with Bechtel on March 2, 1982 and discussed the situation again. Bechtel, at that time, advised Transamerica Delaval that they felt the problem was a reportable incident and were reporting it to the NRC. We received a copy of Bechtel's report to the NRC on March 11. Transamerica Delaval's evaluation of this matter continued and was concluded on March 19, 1982.

Transamerica Delaval has supplied the DSR and DSRV engines, with the potential problem, to the following sites. Those sites marked with an asterik (\*) are those where an isolation valve was furnished by Transamerica Delaval.

Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Station	S/N 74010/12
Middle South Energy, Grand Gulf Station	S/N 74033/36
* Gulf States Utilities, River Bend Station	S/N 74039/40
* Carolina Power & Light, Shearon Harris Station	S/N 74046/49
Cleveland Electric Illuminating, Perry Station	S/N 75051/54
Tennessee Valley Authority, Bellefonte Station	S/N 75080/83
* Tennessee Valley Authority, Hartsville Station	S/N 77024/35
* Washington Public Power Supply, WPPSS #1	S/N 75084/85
* Washington Public Power Supply, WPPSS #4	S/N 76031/32
* Texas Utilities, Commanche Peak 1 & 2	S/N 76001/04
Georgia Power, Vogtle Station	S/N 76021/24
* Consumers Power, Midland 1 & 2	S/N 77001/04

A copy of this letter will be sent to each of the cognizant parties listed in the above paragraph no later than March 24, 1982. Detailed instruction for completing our recommended corrective action will be sent to each site no later than April 30, 1982. We cannot estimate when the corrective action will be complete, since the completion date depends on action by others at the sites.

Sincerely,

*REB*

R. E. Boyer, Manager  
Quality Assurance

REB:cjb