

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

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TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

April 8, 1982

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
Licensee Event Report No. 82-005
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 2



Dear Mr. Engelken:

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving the San Onofre Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System. Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated in section 6.9.1.13 of the technical specification for operation with one control room emergency air cleanup system inoperable.

At 0605 hours on March 9, 1982, upon receiving a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation Signal (TGIS), Train A of the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System failed to start. A work order was issued by operations and the system was investigated to determine the cause of malfunction. The investigation showed that the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System failed to start because the kirk key on breaker 2A0615 of emergency air conditioning unit-E418 was positioned half way toward its normally closed position, consequently, Train A could not be energized. Operability of the system was established by repositioning the kirk key in the breaker to its locked closed position. At 1530 hours of the same day, operability of the system was verified by running Operating Procedure S023-3-3.20 (Monthly Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System Test); subsequently, the system was restored to operable status. Investigation of the cause for the spurious Toxic Gas Isolation Signal determined that intermittent instrument signal spikes in the toxic gas analyzer are producing false toxic gas analyzer trip signals. A design review of toxic gas instrument loop shall be performed in an attempt to eliminate these false Toxic Gas Isolation Signals.

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
Technical specification 3.7.5.a requires an inoperable control room emergency air cleanup system to be restored to operable status within seven days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining operable control room emergency air cleanup system in the recirculating mode. Since the system was verified and declared operable the same day, the required actions of section 3.7.5 were not required to be implemented.

To prevent recurrence of this incident, caution notes will be incorporated in the appropriate procedures so that operating personnel will insure that the kirk key interlock mechanism is correctly positioned to its normal locked closed position.

The control room emergency air cleanup system was determined to be operable and capable of performing its function within 12 hours of the event as required by the Technical Specifications, therefore there was no detrimental effect on public health or safety.

If you should require additional information concerning this occurrence, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: Licensee Event Report LER 82-005

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power and Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chaffee - USNRC Resident Inspector - Unit 2