

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

April 9, 1982

TELEPHONE AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached a correction to RO-269/82-08, submitted on April 6, 1982. This corrected page 2 of the report replaces the page 2 previously submitted. The change is indicated by a sidebar on the corrected page.

This correction should facilitate your review of this event, and we hope this has not caused any inconvenience.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

JFK/php
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. Philip C. Wagner
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action identified the source of the air leak as a missing cap for the test tee for 1PS22. The test tee was capped, thereby reestablishing containment integrity. An investigation was performed on the instrumentation associated with the reactor protective system and engineering safety feature systems to assure that all instruments were properly in service. The investigation revealed no additional abnormalities.

In January 1982 the station Instrumentation and Electrical Section had commenced the process of instituting an independent verification that the item had been returned to its normal state. Prior to January 1982, a redundant verification had been utilized by the crew members performing a calibration. Prior to this incident, procedural steps had identified that an instrument was "returned to normal" but did not identify specific valves, caps, etc. for which verification was required. The Instrumentation and Electrical procedures dealing with safety-related components will be modified to require an independent signature verification that each affected component has been returned to its normal state. This will include an independent verification (different from the person or persons performing the work) that the equipment is properly returned to service if it cannot be confirmed by diverse means (control room indication, string checks, etc.). This will require independent verification of all instrumentation connected to system piping when the system is not in service and in some cases when the system is in service. If equipment is determined to be functional by diverse means it shall be so documented by the individual or individuals performing the work. It is intended that this additional check be as independent a verification as possible. These verification requirements have been added to all Instrumentation and Electrical procedures.

The changes in verification requirements will be presented to all affected personnel with emphasis on the necessity for ensuring proper equipment status for safe operation of the plant.