

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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0	1	N	C	B	E	P	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	9					14	15												25	26					30		57	CAT	58
LICENSE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER																LICENSE TYPE												

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: 01 L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 7 0 3 0 8 8 2 8 0 4 0 7 8 2 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

During plant operation, routine surveillance revealed the makeup demineralized water (MUD) tank inventory was 89,500 gallons, (< 90,000 gallons required) while the fire protection water tank inventory was less than the required 200,000 gallons. The fire protection water tank inventory was restored to > 200,000 gallons in 2 ½ hours and the MUD tank to > 90,000 gallons in 7 ½ hours. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

Technical Specifications 3.7.7.1b, 6.9.1.9b

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
		W	C	A	X	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z				
LER RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34						
17	8	2	—	0	5	2	—	0	3	L	—	0					
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52
H	X	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	Y	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This event occurred when the fire protection water tank makeup supply was isolated  
1 1 while the demineralized water tank makeup supply was unavailable due to planned  
1 2 maintenance. The isolation valve to the fire protection tank was opened and the  
1 3 tank restored to > 200,000 gallons, and makeup to the MUD tank was reestablished  
1 4 and its level restored to > 90,000 gallons.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS (30)		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)			
1	5	E	28	0	8	4	29	NA	A	31	Operator Surveillance

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 34 NA

7 3 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8204160245 820407  
PDR ADOCK 05000324  
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

919-457-9521

1000-0000/97/0000-0000\$05.00/0

LER ATTACHMENT - RO# 2-82-52

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: March 8, 1982

At approximately 0830, an auxiliary operator noticed that the fire protection tank level was less than 200,000 gallons. An investigation determined that a manual valve in the fire tank fill line was closed. The auxiliary operator opened this valve and continued his routine plant surveillance requirements. At approximately 1030, he returned to the fire tank and noted that the level had decreased further. A complete fill line walkdown determined that the automatic fill valve was under clearance in the closed position. A review of the clearance determined that this valve was not required to be shut; therefore, the valve was removed from the clearance and the valve opened. The auxiliary operator verified that the fire tank was being refilled and then continued his routine work. At 1600, while the fire tank was still being refilled (still less than 200,000), it was noted that the makeup demineralized (MUD) water tank level was less than its required 90,000 gallons. This was caused by normal plant usage and maintenance on the demineralizer system which prevented makeup to the tank. The fire tank level was restored to greater than 200,000 gallons at approximately 1830 and the MUD tank was restored to greater than 90,000 gallons at approximately 2315.

An investigation into the closed isolation valves on the fire tank makeup determined that they were isolated to perform maintenance on the demineralizer charcoal beds. This work required that the well water supply to the demineralizer system be placed under clearance; however, when the clearance was written, the well water makeup supply to the fire tank was included. Contributing to the level decrease in the fire tank was the use of water from the fire support system for non-fire support uses throughout the plant. Also, the fire tank level being out of specification was not known by the Shift Foreman until approximately 1300 hours when he reviewed the auxiliary operator's log entry.

To prevent future occurrences of this nature, several actions are being planned. The well water makeup valves to the fire tank will be caution tagged to prevent their being shut without the Shift Foreman's approval. Appropriate fire protection procedures will be revised to require that any non-fire suppression use of the fire system water supply be approved by the Shift Foreman. A review is being performed on the auxiliary operators' logs to establish how they should be kept and maintained. During this review, the logs are being revised to ensure accurate data and good watchstanding procedures are incorporated. Included in these revisions will be a requirement to immediately notify the Shift Foreman of any out of tolerance reading noted.