

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

March 30, 1982

YCRD-50-566/81-15
YCRD-50-567/81-12

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - COOLING TOWER MAKEUP CONTROL -
YCRD-50-566/81-15, YCRD-50-567/81-12 - FIFTH INTERIM REPORT


The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on April 23, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR YCN EEB 8102. This was followed by our interim reports dated May 26, July 8, August 18, and December 8, 1981. As discussed with Inspector R. V. Crlenjak by telephone on March 22, 1982, enclosed is our fifth interim report.

TVA has elected to defer construction activities for this project. Deferral does not mean that the project will be cancelled but that TVA is minimizing its expenditures and construction efforts until such time that TVA has sufficient information to indicate whether the project should be completed or cancelled. Therefore, we will not be submitting a final report for this nonconformance until a final decision is made regarding this project.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
COOLING TOWER MAKEUP CONTROL
NCR YCN EEB 8102
YCRD-50-566/81-15, YCRD-50-567/81-12
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIFTH INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

TVA Heat Rejection Design Criteria N8-KH-D740 and Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Design Criteria N8-KE-D740 impose primary safety-related requirements and the ability to sustain a single active failure on the cooling tower makeup supply. A review of the functional control logic diagram indicates that these requirements are not met by the non-Class IE controls which are provided.

Interim Progress

TVA has analyzed the safety-related requirements imposed by design criteria N8-KH-D740 and N8-KE-740. The design criteria have been revised to correct deficiencies in the safety-related and Class IE requirements, which were previously imposed. The functional control logic diagram and other design documents will be revised to reflect the new requirements.