

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128


SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. B. RAY

STATION MANAGER

April 7, 1982

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368



Docket No. 50-361
Licensee Event Report No. 82-007
San Onofre, Unit 2

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken
Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

This letter provides written notification to your office of an inadvertent initiation of a water spray fire protection system at elevation 30 foot in the cable riser area of the Unit 2 Control Building. In accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.d, this letter is submitted as the 30 day report. In addition, Licensee Event Report No. 82-007 is enclosed concerning this event.

Our investigation determined the following to be the cause of this inadvertent initiation of the water spray fire protection system.

On March 3, 1982, at 0900, with the reactor in Mode 6, Operations and Maintenance personnel were isolating the water spray fire protection system in the cable riser area on the 30 foot elevation in the Unit 2 Control Building. Due to a misunderstanding between personnel, the area manual switch (2HS8973) was disabled, activating the deluge valve (2HS8973A) before the manual block valve (2S2301MU200) was shut.

The block valve is at the 42 foot elevation within a stairwell adjacent to the manual switch. Upon initiation of the water spray system, the Operator could not shut the manual block valve because he could not gain access to it due to a closed one-way security door into the stairwell from the 30 foot elevation of the Control Building.

The Control Room was immediately notified and an Operator was dispatched to enter the stairwell from the 70 foot elevation. The affected water spray system was isolated at 0915. During the period in which the system was in operation, water from the cable riser area entered the Unit 2 Control Room area through a local access door reaching 1/4" in depth in places.

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Water damaged fire retardant material will be replaced and a fire watch has been established within the effected zone until repairs are completed. There are no electric junction boxes or cable connection points within the affected area. No electrical grounds were observed as a result of the incident. The raceways and cable design criteria includes provisions to protect against this type of event, and it has been determined that no plant equipment operation was affected. Accordingly, there was no effect upon Public Health and Safety.

As a result of this event the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) will be requested to review the plant security system to determine if plant personnel accessibility is restricted to such an extent that corrective action to investigate minor plant events is unnecessarily impaired.

Additionally, a design review of the floor drain system for plant areas served by wet fire protection systems shall be performed to determine if there exists sufficient draining capacity to prevent flooding of adjacent areas, and whether area curbs are required to limit general flooding. The possibility of adding alternate manual switches will also be examined to determine if additional switches should be installed to reduce the potential for accidental system operation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Blay".

Attachment (LER No. 82-007)

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power and Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chaffee - USNRC Resident Inspector - Unit 2