

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242
ATLANTA REGIONAL OFFICE
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

82 MAY 7 P 1:37
April 28, 1982

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
IE Inspection Report
50-269/82-09
50-270/82-09
50-287/82-09


Dear Sir:

With regard to Mr. R. C. Lewis's letter of March 4, 1982 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the information contained therein to be proprietary.

Please find attached responses to the cited item of noncompliance.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, executed on April 28, 1982.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

JFK/php
Attachment

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Duke Power Company
Responses to IE Inspection Reports
50-269/82-09, 50-270/82-09, and 50-287/82-09

Violation A

Technical Specification 3.5.2.5 requires that the axial power shaping rod, positions be maintained in compliance with technical specification figure 3.5.2-4A1.

Contrary to the above, on February 27, 1982, the Oconee Unit 1 axial power Shaping rods were positioned outside the allowable limits for a period of eight hours.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.E.).

Response

1) Admission or denial of alleged violation:

The violation is correct as stated. This incident was reported to NRC as Reportable Occurrence RO-269/82-02, dated March 12, 1982.

2) Reasons for the violation:

This violation resulted from personnel error on the part of the Control Operators involved. Group 8 APSR's were moved into the restricted region in order to clear a core axial imbalance alarm, but the operators did not know or verify that the rods were in the restricted region. Group 8 APSR's had no position alarms.

3) Corrective actions taken and results:

When the rod positions were noted on a subsequent shift, the Group 8 APSR's were moved back into the allowable operating region. The startup procedure has been changed to require verification that all control rods, including Group 8, are within the proper position limitations prior to exceeding 80% power. The Operations personnel involved have been counseled concerning this incident.

4) Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

The computer alarms and statalarms are being modified to include Group 8 position limits.

5) Date when full compliance will be achieved:

It is expected that the modifications noted in (4) will be completed on all Oconee units by September 15, 1982.

Violation B

Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires that the station be operated and maintained in accordance with written approved procedures.

Contrary to the above, on February 20, 1982, licensee health physics technicians did not employ the directions embodied in procedure HP/O/B/1000/62/Q which led to two radioactive liquid effluent releases in violation of procedure OP/O/A/1106/31. Total radioactive liquid release was 2.207 curies which is below the technical specification limits.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E).

Response

- 1) Admission or denial of the alleged violation:

This violation is correct as stated.

- 2) Reasons for the violations:

The violations resulted from personnel error on the part of the Health Physics technicians involved. They determined the Dilution Flow Rate (DFR) for each release by a method other than the calculations required by procedure HP/O/B/1000/62Q.

- 3) Corrective actions taken and results:

Sample results of releases were compared with recorded DFR values, which were corrected. This information was correlated with other liquid releases occurring at the time of the cited releases. No two releases occurred simultaneously, and the corrected DFRs for the two cited releases did not exceed the 38 cfs normally supplied by Keowee Hydro Station; therefore, no release limits were violated.

The technicians involved were counseled concerning this error. All HP personnel involved in processing sample requests have been reminded of the correct method by procedure to calculate DFRs.

- 4) Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

No further corrective action is considered necessary.

- 5) Date when full compliance will be achieved:

All corrective actions have been completed.