



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

May 27, 1982

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-82/13, Final Report, RCI
Supports
AECM-82/240

Reference: AECM-82/182, 4/28/82

On March 17, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R. Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns supports installed and accepted by Reactor Controls, Inc. (RCI) that are not in accordance with approved design requirements.

Based on the results of our investigation, we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). All details are provided in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.
For J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

ACP:dr
ATTACHMENT

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
NRC

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cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-82/13

I. Description of the Deficiency

Reactor Controls, Incorporated (RCI) has accepted Control Rod Drive (CRD) support installations which are not in accordance with design requirements. These are documented on RCI Nonconformance documents "QC Holds" 141-41, 142-41, 143-41, 157-41, 158-41 and 159-41.

The deficiency only affects the CRD Hydraulic System C-11. It does not apply to the NSSS vendor.

The cause of the deficiency was RCI's failure to follow the requirements of their approved QA program. 10CFR21 is not applicable since the CRD supports involved with the deficiency have not been accepted by MP&L. RCI has not offered the supports for acceptance and a 10CFR21 report is not applicable at this time.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

An evaluation of the noted conditions has been performed by RCI. It was found that scram header supports No. 6 and No. 8 on the 270° side and support No. 6 on the 90° side could have possible weld over-stress conditions.

During a seismic event the noted supports could have failed to perform their intended design function; therefore, the safety of plant operations could not be assured had the condition remained uncorrected.

We have determined that the noted condition should be reported under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

III. Corrective Actions Taken

The cause of the deficiency was RCI's failure to follow the requirements of their approved QA program. The extent of the deficiency is limited to the QC Holds identified above. RCI performed a 100% re-inspection of all C-11 supports that had previously been accepted.

The QC Holds have been dispositioned to repair the deficiencies. The repairs have been completed per approved procedures. RCI QC has verified the repairs and the QC Holds have been closed.

RCI's QC supervisor has verbally instructed personnel performing inspections to follow the requirements of their QA procedure for inspections.

In addition, our Constructor's QC has increased their monitoring activities of RCI's re-inspection activities by performing a 100% inspection of random selected installed supports until such time the confidence level of RCI's inspections allow stoppage of the 100% inspections.