



LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD • WADING RIVER, N.Y. 11792

June 2, 1982

SNRC- 707

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Remote Shutdown Panel
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-322

Reference:(1) Letter SNRC-691 dated April 20, 1982

Dear Mr. Denton:

Enclosed are sixty (60) copies of a revised response to the NRC Staff Question 223.93 on the remote shutdown panel (RSP). The original response had been submitted in the Reference 1 letter. This revised response clarifies certain items based on discussions on May 11, 1982 with NRC staff from the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch.

It should be noted that other responses in the series 223.94 through 223.98 on the RSP were also discussed. The staff agreed that they would discuss certain items with the Reactor Systems Branch and advise LILCO if additional clarification was required. As of this date, no further clarification has been requested by the staff.

If any additional questions should arise, please contact this office.

Very truly yours,

J. L. Smith
Manager, Special Projects
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station

RWG:mp

Enclosure

cc: J. Higgins
All parties

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Request 223.93:

In Table 1 of SNRC-638, assuming a single failure of the SRV valves at the RSP, credit is being taken for the RCIC system to reduce reactor pressure. Verification should be provided that the RCIC turbine steam flow is sufficient to reduce reactor pressure to achieve cold shutdown. The time to reach cold shutdown should be provided.

Response:

In the event of an SRV control failure at the RSP, RCIC would operate manually to control RPV water level and maintain the reactor in the hot shutdown condition. Pressure in the reactor would cycle between various high and low limits according to RCIC operation and mechanical SRV actuations. The RPV could be maintained in this mode for as long as required from the RSP. If no other operator actions are performed, the RPV pressure would not drop sufficiently in the short term to allow cold shutdown operation. Decay heat steam production would exceed the rate of steam extracted due to RCIC turbine operation for many days. The SRV's could be operated manually from the relay room, although no credit was originally taken for accessibility to this area for this event. The three SRV's controlled from the RSP are powered from Division I. The seven SRV's controlled from the relay room are powered from Division II. The control switches for the seven relay room SRV's are keylocked with one set of keys being kept in the RSP room. Access to the relay room will be permissible because the control room and relay room utilize separate HVAC systems with a common outdoor intake. Thus an uninhabitable condition originating in the control room will not affect the relay room. The time to reach cold shutdown using this method would be on the order of an hour. Thus the plant could be maintained at hot shutdown from the RSP and brought to cold shutdown via various operator actions.