

REGION II
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
USNRB
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

82 MAY 2

April 30, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 SPECIAL REPORT 82-2

The enclosed special report provides details concerning penetration fire
barrier being non-functional for a period in excess of seven days. This
report is submitted in accordance with Sequoyah unit 1 Technical
Specification 3.7.12 and 6.9.2.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

H. J. Green
H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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Washington, DC 20555

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

SPECIAL REPORT 82-2

UNIT 1

Event Description

Electrical penetration 721C0420Q000 in the control building cable spreading room was breached for a period greater than seven (7) days.

Four pipe penetrations between the turbine building and auxiliary building were breached for a period greater than seven (7) days.

Probable Cause

The cable penetration was breached on 03/26/82 and during cable pulling on 03/29/82 and 03/30/82, the cables became contaminated. Health Physics surveys could not locate the source and required HP personnel be present when cables were being pulled. Due to these unexpected delays, the cable pulling was not complete until 04/02/82 (7th day). Personnel began sealing the penetration immediately, but the resealing was not complete until 04/05/82.

The pipe penetrations were breached on 04/13/82 to install piping for an essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system piping modification. Failure to seal the penetrations within the seven (7) day requirement has been attributed to the cognizant engineer being unaware of the seriousness of sealing the penetrations within time requirements and installation of the forms for sealing the penetrations being delayed due to the alignment of the piping in the penetration. The penetrations were resealed on 04/23/82.

Corrective Actions

Foremen, general foremen, and engineers were instructed in the importance of meeting the seven (7) day breaching requirement. Communication between shifts was also stressed to ensure maximum use of allotted time while penetrations are breached so that time will be available for unseen problems.