

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Final Report
Water in Valve Operator
NE File: 3.1051

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

On March 5, 1982, Mr. Virgil Brownlee of NRC Region II was notified of a potential significant deficiency on the subject "water found in valve operator 8886."

A review of the maintenance work request forms and the nonconformance notice showed that the valve was tagged out of service when the water was found in the valve operator. It is believed that the water resulted from construction workers washing down the area with hoses.

If the valve operator was energized when the water leaked into the valve operator, the electrical fuse could have blown thus indicating a problem. The water damage occurred while the valve operator was deenergized and tagged out. Electrical maintenance discovered the water problem in the process of performing a maintenance work request. The valve 8886 is in the Safety Injection System. This valve is closed during safety injection and cold leg recirculation, and opened for hot leg recirculation.

The valve operator was returned to working condition by changing contacts on the torque switch, replacing water damaged parts, and meggering motor leads. The water problem with the valve operator is mainly associated with cable entry from the top of the box. The corrective action for the valve operator with top cable entry, was to drill a 1/8 to 1/4 inch weep hole in the bottom of the operator to allow water to leak out if water or moisture gets into the operator housing. The weep hole was drilled at the lowest point for complete drainage. There are space heaters inside the operator to keep the operator dry.

All other Limitorque operators which could have a water problem were identified. An inspection for water problems was performed and none of the valves operators showed any water damage. In these valve operators with top cable entry, a weep hole was drilled in the bottom of the operator.

Even though corrective action described above has been made to Limitorque operators, Nuclear Engineering determined that the loss of the valve operator is not reportable as a 10CFR50.55e. The damage occurred when the valve was out of service and was repaired prior to putting the system back in service. This is considered a final report of this matter.

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
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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
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Very truly yours,



T. C. Nichols, Jr.
Senior Vice President
Power Operations

TB:TCN:tdh

cc: V. C. Summer
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