



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

April 16, 1982

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416/417
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-82/05, Final Report, CRD
Housing Lower Support
AECM-82/165

On February 5, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. Ross Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns nuts and jam nuts not threading properly onto the Control Rod Drive (CRD) housing lower supports.

We have determined that this deficiency is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) for Mississippi Power & Light. All details are included in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly,


For J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr
ATTACHMENT

cc: See page 2

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Member Middle South Utilities System

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
NRC

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cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-82/05

I. Description of the Deficiency

Nuts and jam nuts would not thread onto the support rods for the Control Rod Drive (CRD) housing lower support. All nuts and rods were affected although several nuts (approximately 20) will thread on with some difficulty. The problem was corrected at several locations with the use of a tap and die.

The deficiency affects Unit 1. The CRD housing support hanger rods were delivered to the site with defective threads, which were caused by worn out dies used by the vendor. The problem was not detected by General Electric's routine acceptance inspection.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

The CRD housing lower support exists to limit the displacement (ejection distance) of a control rod and control rod drive housing in the event of a rod ejection accident. The ejected rod and housing will impact upon the support steel after very limited travel and thus will not become a missile nor will it result in a breach of the reactor coolant primary boundary.

During the installation of the GGNS Unit 1 support steel, field personnel could not properly thread the nuts and jam nuts onto the support rods. The problem was primarily limited to the support rods which appeared to have poorly fabricated threads. By chasing the rod threads (and in a few cases the nut threads as well) with a die, field personnel were able to properly mate the nuts and jam nuts to the support rods.

Mississippi Power & Light has determined that this deficiency is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) for the following reasons.

- 1) The nuts and jam nuts could not be "hand tightened" on the support rod threads. However, had hand tools been employed, the nuts and jam nuts could probably have been installed to the specified clearance. These connections would be fully satisfactory to perform the intended safety function.
2. Corrective actions were employed to recut the support rod threads through the use of a thread die. This resulted in the ability of field personnel to make the connection by hand. The nut/jam nut interface was then tightened using wrenches to the desired tightness. The final connections conform to the specified clearance requirements.

3. No installation condition, conforming to the specified clearance requirements, could result that would compromise or degrade the safety function of the CRD housing lower support steel.

III. Corrective Actions Taken

The problem was corrected as identified above. GE issued Field Disposition Deviation Request (FDDR) JBI-475 to cover corrective actions.

To preclude recurrence GE will instruct their QA/QC personnel to be more thorough during routine inspections prior to acceptance of shipments from the vendor.