



LOUISIANA
POWER & LIGHT


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May 18, 1982

G. D. McLENDON
Senior Vice President

W3K-82-0284
Q-3-A35.07.55

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012



SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-382
Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55
"Hold Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect Structural
Calculations"

Reference: Telecon - R. G. Bennett (LP&L) to D. Tomlinson (NRC) on
April 7, 1982

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby
providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction
Deficiency No. 55, "Hold Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect
Structural Calculations." This item was originally identified as
PRD No. 75.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

Thomas F. Gerula for

GDMcL/LLB/grf

Attachment

- cc: 1) Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555
(with 15 copies of report)
- 2) Director
Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555
(with 1 copy of report)

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LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3

Interim Report of
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55

Hold Up and Boric Acid Make Up Tanks Incorrect Structural Calculations

Reviewed by *R. J. Milhiser* 5/17/82
R. J. Milhiser - Site Manager Date

Reviewed by *J. V. Wills* 5/18/82
J. V. Wills - Project Superintendent Date

Reviewed by *J. Hart* 5-17-82
J. Hart - Project Licensing Engineer Date

Reviewed by *John DeBruin* 5/13/82
J. DeBruin - ESSE Project Engineer Date

Reviewed by *J. Gutierrez* 5-17-82
J. Gutierrez - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date

May 13, 1982

INTERIM REPORT
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 55
HOLD UP AND BORIC ACID MAKE UP TANKS INCORRECT STRUCTURAL CALCULATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes errors that have been found in Vendor Stress Reports, which include the seismic support rings and lugs of the hold up and boric acid make up tanks. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

During review of Vendor Stress Reports by Combustion Engineering in regard to the four (4) hold up tanks and both boric acid make up tanks, the structural calculations were found to be in error. It has been determined that none of the above mentioned as-built tanks can accommodate the present Ebasco support structure which imposes radial loads on the seismic support rings. Additionally, it has been tentatively concluded that the hold up tanks are not structurally adequate as supported.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Failure of the boric acid make up tanks could reduce the ability of the Chemical and Volume Control System to charge the Reactor Coolant system following a small break LOCA. Therefore, the seismic design deficiency of the boric acid make up tanks could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.

Failure of the hold up tanks has the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material. This radiological release may increase the previously calculated release for the postulated waste System Failure documented in FSAR Subsection 15.7.3.2. Therefore, the seismic design deficiency of the hold up tanks could adversely affect the safety of the plant if left uncorrected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Presently, Ebasco is in the process of determining the necessary design changes required. This will be completed by July 15, 1982. At that time, a construction schedule can be defined. An Interim Report will be submitted by August 2, 1982.

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3

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Significant Construction Deficiency No. 55

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