

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

SYSTEM CODE W B 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE B 13		COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X 14		COMP. SUBCODE B 15		VALVE SUBCODE D 16			
7 8		9 10		11 12		13 18		19 20		21 22			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17		EVENT YEAR 8 2		SHUTDOWN METHOD —		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 9		OCCURRENCE CODE / 0 3		REPORT TYPE L —		REVISION NO. 0	
23 24		25 26		27 28		29 30		31 32		33 34		35 36	
ACTION TAKEN F 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25	
37 38		39 40		41 42		43 44		45 46		47 48		49 50	
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51 52		53 54		55 56		57 58		59 60		61 62		63 64	
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65 66		67 68		69 70		71 72		73 74		75 76		77 78	
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79 80		81 82		83 84		85 86		87 88		89 90		91 92	
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93 94		95 96		97 98		99 100		101 102		103 104		105 106	
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107 108		109 110		111 112		113 114		115 116		117 118		119 120	
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121 122		123 124		125 126		127 128		129 130		131 132		133 134	
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135 136		137 138		139 140		141 142		143 144		145 146		147 148	
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149 150		151 152		153 154		155 156		157 158		159 160		161 162	
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163 164		165 166		167 168		169 170		171 172		173 174		175 176	
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177 178		179 180		181 182		183 184		185 186		187 188		189 190	
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191 192		193 194		195 196		197 198		199 200		201 202		203 204	
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205 206		207 208		209 210		211 212		213 214		215 216		217 218	
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219 220		221 222											

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7 8 9 10
 PUBLICITY
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
 2 0 N (44) NA
 8205240388 820511
 PDR ADDCK 05000285
 S PDR
 NRC USE ONLY
 7 8 9 10 68 69

PHONE: 402-426-4011

LER No. 82-009
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 05000285

Attachment No. 1

Safety Analysis

Technical Specification 2.3 governs the number of heat exchangers that can be inoperable. When that number is exceeded, Technical Specification 2.0.1 applies. At the time of discovery, more than two heat exchangers were inoperable; thus, Technical Specification 2.0.1 was invoked and the plant operators commenced preparations to place the plant in hot shutdown within six hours. However, by immediately dispatching the auxiliary operator to investigate the problem, three of the four heat exchangers were returned to operable status within a few minutes of the incident.

Because the three heat exchangers were inoperable for a short duration, no significant safety problem occurred.

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Attachment No. 2

Corrective Action

Upon discovery by the operator that the three valves HCV-490B, HCV-491B and HCV-492B would not open, the auxiliary operator was immediately dispatched to the valves to investigate the problem. The operator "tapped" on various parts of the valve actuators and HCV-490B and HCV-492B immediately opened. The outlet valves HCV-490B and 492B were then successfully operated and cycled several times. After verifying the operability of HCV-490B and HCV-492B, three component cooling water heat exchangers were then in service. HCV-491B was then disassembled to determine why the valve would not open. After disassembly, there was no apparent damage to the valve and no obvious reason for the valve not to operate. However, the suspected cause was due to binding between the valve stem and packing; therefore, the packing was adjusted, the valve reassembled and cycled several times successfully.

The two other valves (HCV-490B and 492B) were subsequently checked and packing was also adjusted. These valves were then cycled several additional times to ensure operability.

All of these valves are normally cycled two to three times each week. The valves will continue to be cycled as a normal plant operation when cycling component cooling water heat exchangers; thus, this will allow us to monitor these valves for future problems.

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Attachment No. 3

Failure Data

This is the first instance, at the Fort Calhoun Station, of having three simultaneously inoperable component cooling water heat exchangers. Additionally, the three valves that failed to open have not exhibited a history of similar failures.