

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	A	L	B	R	F	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	9						14	15	25										26	30					57	CAT	58	
		LICENSEE CODE							LICENSE NUMBER											LICENSE TYPE									

CON'T

7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 7 0 4 1 2 8 2 8 0 5 1 0 8 2 9

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal operation, while performing SI 4.2.B-7, (instrumentation that initiate
0 3 | or control the CSCS reactor low pressure), pressure switch 2-PS-68-96 Sw. #1
0 4 | was found to operate at 258 psig instead of 230 psig \pm 15 as required by T.S. 3.2.B.
0 5 | This switch closes the recirculation pump discharge valves on low reactor pressure.
0 6 | There was no danger to the health or safety of the public because redundant switches
0 7 | were available and operable.

08 | _____ 8

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [8 | 2] [—] [0 | 1 | 3] [/] [0 | 3] [L] [—] NO. 0
 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
E	18	F	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	N	25	B	0	8	0
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Pressure switch, 2-PS68-96 Sw. #1, calibration had drifted. The Barton model 288

1 1 | pressure switch was immediately recalibrated, functionally tested per SI 4.2.8-7,

1 2 | and returned to service. See attached action plan for corrective action, category 3.

13

1 4 7 8 9

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION				
1	5	E	(28)	0	9	6	(29)	NA	B	(31)	Surveillance testing	(32)

8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60							
ACTIVITY CONTENT																																																											
RELEASED OF RELEASE																																																											
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)																																			LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)																								

7 8 9 10 11 NA 44 45 NA 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	

8	9	11	12	13	80
PERSONNEL INJURIES					
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)					

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION
1	8	NA

	8	9	10	11	12		80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				(43)			
TYPE — DESCRIPTION							

1	9	Z	(42)	NA
7	8	9	10	

ISSUED (45) DESCRIPTION 8205210263 820510
PDR ADOCK 05000260
NRC USE ONLY

7 8 9 10 S PDR 68 69 80

NAME OF PREPARER

Bobby J. Irby

PHONE: (205) 729-0841

NRC USE ONLY

8205210263 820510
PDR ADCK 05000260
S PDR

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 8213 Technical Specification Involved 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC 5/11/82

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 2 were at 1040 MWe and 1050 MWe, respectively, and unit 3 was in a maintenance outage. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. While performing Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.2.B-7 (Instrumentation that initiate or control the CSCS Reactor Low Pressure), pressure switch 2-PS-68-96, Switch No. 1, operated at 258 psig. Technical Specification Table 3.2.B requires this switch to operate at 230 psig \pm 15 psig. This switch gives an operative signal to close the recirculation pump discharge valves on low reactor pressure. The cause was setpoint drift. The Barton model 288 pressure switch was immediately recalibrated per SI 4.2.B-7 and returned to service. There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, plant employees, or equipment at anytime because the redundant switches were available and operable. See the attached action plan for corrective action (category 3).

* Previous Similar Events:

259/7702, 7810, 8184, 8206; 260/8203; 296/7910, 7928, 8018

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter-electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken:

Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.

Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.

Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.