

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK.

							( )
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-----

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

001	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
LICENSEE CODE						LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE					ST CAT			

CONT.

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 4 0 9 8 2 8 0 5 0 7 8 2 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 66 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

013 With the Unit at 4% nuclear power, it was found through an attempted blended makeup

5 5 that no flow could be obtained from 1-CH-P-2C. This resulted in loss of recirc.








014 flow to the BIT. This event is reportable per T.S.-3.2.C.2 and T.S.-3.3.A.2 and is

015 | reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2). The "D" boric acid transfer pump was returned to

016 | service within 15 minutes and the BIT remained within specifications, therefore, the

07 | health and safety of the public were not affected.

018 \_\_\_\_\_

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 82 0203 L 0

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURE		
A	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	A	25	G	2	0
32	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 The transfer pump would not pump due to a failure of the pump/motor coupling.

11 1-CH-P-2D was placed in service and maintenance performed on the 'C' pump.

13

14

FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 C 29 0 0 4 29 OTHER STATUS (30) N/A METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A 32 Operational Event

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

N/A

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				
NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION		
1   7	0   0   0	(37)   2   (38)	N/A	

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	2	3	4	5	6
		0	0	0	41 N/A

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	

PUBLICITY  
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
 2 0 N (44) 8205180 611 N/A  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
 NRC USE ONLY

Very respectfully, J. L. Wilson

(804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO: 50-281  
REPORT NO: 82-020/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 04-09-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Failure of 'C' Boric Acid Transfer Pump

1. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

With the Unit at 4% nuclear power, it was found through an attempt to perform a blended makeup that no flow could be obtained from boric acid transfer pump 1-CH-P-2C. This resulted in loss of recirculation flow to the Boron Injection Tank (BIT), and since 1-CH-P-2D was tagged out for preventative maintenance, this event is reportable per T.S.-3.2.C.2 and T.S.-3.3.A.2. This condition is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S.-3.2.D.1 and T.S.-3.3.B.10 and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The boric acid transfer pumps supply normal makeup to the RCS, and maintain recirculation flow between the BIT and the boric acid storage tanks to assure that the BIT remains full of concentrated boric acid. Three of the 4 transfer pumps are required for 2 unit operation. The tags were immediately cleared on the "D" transfer pump and it was returned to service within 15 minutes, also, the concentration in the BIT remained within specifications, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The boric acid transfer pump would not pump due to a failure of the pump/motor coupling.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to clear the tags on 1-CH-P-2D, place it in service, and verify that it was operable via PT 18.9.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The subsequent corrective action was to verify that the BIT was within specifications. It was verified to be at 12.2% which is well within the limits of 11.5% to 13.0% as required by Technical Specifications.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

None required.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.