

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/4/0/8/8/2/ (8) /0/5/0/3/8/2/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On April 8, 1982, with Unit No. 1 at 100% power, a charcoal sample laboratory /
/0/3/ / analysis from the process vent filter did not meet the testing criteria of reg- /
/0/4/ / ulatory guide 1.52, Rev. 2. The effluent from the process vent filter is con- /
/0/5/ / tinuously monitored and did not exceed any release limits; therefore, the health /
/0/6/ / and safety of the general public were not affected. This is reportable pursuant /
/0/7/ / to T.S. 3.6.4.3 and 6.9.1.9.b. /

/0/8/ /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
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/0/9/ /M/B/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/F/ (13)	/X/X/X/X/X/X/ (14)	/Z/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.

(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/1/7/ / \ / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
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/C/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /x/9/9/9/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The charcoal contained in the process vent filter system may be subjected to /
/1/1/ / welding and painting fumes during refueling/maintenance outages which tend to /
/1/2/ / shorten the lifetime of the carbon absorber. The charcoal was just naturally /
/1/3/ / depleted. The redundant filter was placed in service and the charcoal was /
/1/4/ / replaced in the depleted filter. /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
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/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /B/ (31) /Periodic Surveillance Test/

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
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/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
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/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
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/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
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/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
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/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

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Description of Event

On November 4, 1981, with Unit No. 1 at 100% power, test results were received indicating that the "B" process vent charcoal filter had a methyl iodide penetration in excess of the acceptable limit. The laboratory analysis indicated a penetration of 6.5% when tested in accordance with regulatory guide 1.52, Rev. 2 and ANSI N510-1976. The maximum allowable penetration is 5%.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The redundant charcoal filter was available for use. The effluent of the process vent system is monitored continuously and since the gaseous release limits were not exceeded, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The carbon absorber in the process vent filter system is analyzed every 720 hours of filter operation. The process vent system handles gases from many systems; However a majority of the through put is dilution air which is drawn from the third floor of the Auxiliary Building. Welding and painting during the Unit No. 2 Refueling Outage in the Auxiliary Building may have allowed welding and painting fumes to communicate with the process vent filter. The filter reached the end of its natural lifetime and the carbon sample had a penetration slightly higher than the allowable maximum penetration.

Immediate Corrective Action

The inoperable filter was removed from service and the redundant filter was lined up for use. The carbon was replaced in the depleted filter bank and the absorber was tested satisfactorily in accordance with the required surveillance. The replenished filter was then left as the "Standby" filter.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action is required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The existing requirement to sample and analyze the carbon every 720 hours of filter operation is adequate to prevent severe degradation of the absorber according to present testing history.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications.